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Abstract
Sixteen years after the promulgation of the reforms to Article 27 that regulates land tenure in
Mexico, there is consensus among political authorities, public officials, private investors, and
scholars that the outcomes have been completely different than were predicted. In spite of the
important changes produced in the legal status, internal organization, and governmental
interactions of the agrarian communities, these changes have not translated into a massive
privatization of ejido lands, and the incorporation of social land into urban development is far
below what was expected. Furthermore, new forms of illegal social land sales emerged as a
response to the privatization initiative.
In addition to the economic and legal arguments typically used to explain this phenomenon, this
research identifies three key factors that also have a strong influence in the ejidos' behavior
towards land privatization: the hindering effect of community participation on privatization; the
permanence of a clientelistic relationship between ejidos and government; and agrarian
communities' cultural attachment to land. These factors reflect the economic, political, and
cultural dimensions of the ejidos, something that the ideologues did not take into account when
they defined the mechanisms for land liberalization.
Key words: urban expansion, Mexico City, ejidos, Article 27, informal market, regularization,
clientelism
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City Growth and Community-Owned Land in Mexico City I Introduction
Introduction
Cuando despert6, el dinosaurio todavia estaba aliL
Augusto Monterroso, El Dinosaurio
Explosive Urban Growth and the Failure of Planning in Mexico City
Rapid and unplanned urban expansion is a widespread phenomenon in Latin American cities.
Recent history provides plenty of examples: Lima, Sao Paulo, Caracas, Bogotai, Rio de Janeiro,
Santiago, and many other cities of the region experienced dramatic growth in the midst of the last
century. This was the natural outcome of the massive migration of thousands of people from rural
to urban areas due to the process of import substitution - and subsequent industrialization of the
national economy - implemented by most Latin American countries during that time. This
unprecedented process of explosive urbanization completely changed the territorial distribution
of many of the countries of the area, which were not prepared to receive the avalanche of
unskilled and deprived migrants that arrived in the main cities every day. Faced with this
situation, the governments were simply overwhelmed by the challenge of providing housing to
the massive wave of newcomers, and what the market supplied was unaffordable for people
whose meager income barely allowed them to subsist.
In such a context, the only means by which the immigrants could find affordable housing was by
illegally settling in vacant lands usually located in the outskirts of the cities. From an urban
planning perspective, the consequences were disastrous: a significant percentage of the
population living in precarious conditions in squatter settlements; chaotic public transportation
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and traffic congestion; pollution and devastation of the environment; excessive exploitation of
natural resources; loss of agricultural land; and in general terms a notorious decrease in the
quality of life of most of the urban population.
This phenomenon was experienced in Mexico City with more intensity than in any other place in
Latin America. Just to provide an idea of the magnitude of the urban expansion, the population
increased from 5.4 million to 9.1 million people between 1960 and 1970 in the Mexican capital.
This meant the increase of the urban area from 21,940 to 42,574 hectares in the same period.'
Currently, more than 19.2 million people live in the metropolitan area comprised of the 16
delegaciones of the Federal District (DF) and 59 conurbated municipalities from the States of
Mexico and Hidalgo.2 This number makes the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City (MAMC) the
second largest of the world, just behind Tokyo.
A direct result of explosive expansion is that more than 5.1 million people (30.3% of the
population) lived in squatter settlements in the MAMC by 2001 (Iracheta, 2005). In addition,
permanent traffic congestion is the direct outcome of chronic deficit of transportation
infrastructure; air pollution reaches critical levels for a great part of the year; and the excessive
exploitation of the aquifer has produced both severe problems in the water supply for a
significant part of the urban area, and progressive sinking of the city, which reaches an average of
3 inches a year (Legorreta, Contreras et al., 1997).
' Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geograffa e Informdtica (INEGI), http://www.inegi.gob.mx, and
Metr6poli 2025, http://www.metropoli.org.mx
2 According to the 2005 Population and Housing Census, population in the DF is 8,720,916 people, whereas in the 59
conurbated municipalities is 10,518,994 people. Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informitica
(INEGI), http://www.inegi.gob.mx
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Ejidos and Urban Expansion in Mexico City
What makes the Mexican case particularly interesting is the fact that most of the urban expansion
in the recent decades has taken place on a type of property that does not exist in the rest of the
Latin American cities. A legacy of the agrarian reform implemented as a consequence of the
Mexican revolution started in 1910, ejidos are rural lands for collective use that currently occupy
half of the territory of the country and 2/3 of the land that surrounds the main Mexican cities
(Iracheta, 2001.) According to the data provided by the Register and Historical Archive of
Agrarian Communities (PHINA), the 370 ejidos that currently exist in the MAMC own more
than 260,000 hectares of land. This area is equivalent to 2.3 times the urban area of Mexico City,
which by the year 2000 was calculated to be 114,000 hectares. 3 In other words, due to the
magnitude of their participation in land distribution, ejidos will always be relevant actors in the
urban development of any Mexican city.
The legal status of ejidos is framed by Article 27 of the Political Constitution of 1917, which
regulates land property in Mexico. This article establishes 3 types of land property: public,
private, and social. The latter includes ejidos and also comunidades, which are areas in which the
entire land is entitled to the whole community, and all of its members have the right of
exploitation in a collective way.4 The most important statement of this article originally pointed
out that social property was inalienable, imprescriptible, and non-transferable. In other words,
either sale, rent, cession or use of land as a collateral for a loan were explicitly prohibited.
3 Source: Metr6poli 2025. http://www.metropoli.org.mx
4 Since comunidades own only 16% of the social property land in Mexico, this study will only analyze the relevance
of ejidos in urban expansion.
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However, what seemed like a system oriented to guarantee the livelihood of many generations of
peasants, in practice became a serious urban problem when those communities, originally created
for agrarian exploitation, started to be enveloped by the advance of urban sprawl.
As is usual in these cases, the pressure for lands to allocate to the new inhabitants of the cities
was much stronger than the legal and institutional framework established both in the Constitution
and in the Agrarian Code (Ley Agraria). Therefore, an explosive process of informal urban
expansion has been experienced within ejido boundaries since the midst of the last century. A
series of land invasions and irregular sales in which ejido leaders, public officials and political
authorities were usually involved resulted in 40% of the population in Mexico City living in
informal housing by 1980 (Oberai, 1993).
By the early nineties, the situation in urban ejidos was completely chaotic, regulated by an
obsolete institutional framework that neither government nor ejidatarios were willing to respect.
As the former director of the Secretariat of the Agrarian Reform Arturo Warman (1994) pointed
out, the established system "not only hosted violence and leaderships engaged with speculative
interests; it also severely affected the urban development, which had to follow the path created by
consummated facts in lands that were supposedly off the formal market."'
In addition, by that time the government was not able to provide new lands to all of the peasants
who were not members of the existing agrarian communities, and agricultural production within
ejido boundaries had fallen to unprecedented levels. This scenario led the government headed by
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988 - 1994) to decide to make drastic changes to Article
5 Translated from the original Spanish by Rodrigo Dfaz.
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27, to the laws that regulate land tenure, land use, and natural resources, and to all of the public
institutions in charge of agrarian issues.
The reforms, passed in 1992, were in tune with the neo-liberal agenda promoted by President
Salinas de Gortari (Vaizquez-Castillo, 2004), and were considered a radical change in the way
ejidos and communities had been treated until that time. Hence, they established a series of lines
of action oriented, on the one hand to consolidate the property rights of ejidatarios, and on the
other hand, to give more flexibility to the members of agrarian communities to administer their
lands (Warman, 1994). The latter was the most controversial aspect of the reforms, because it
abolished the inalienable, imprescriptible, and non-transferable characteristics that social property
lands had had until that time. In practice, these changes allowed ejidatarios to create mercantile
societies between members of the same community, and between ejidatarios and private
investors, and, with the possibility given to ejidatarios to segregate their individual parcels from
the ejido, transforming their land into private property which might be legally offered in the land
market.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Sixteen years after the release of the reforms to Article 27, there is consensus among political
authorities, public officials, private investors, and scholars that the level of privatization of ejido
land was significantly lower than expected both by its ideologues and detractors. In spite of the
important changes produced in the internal organization of the ejidos and in the way they relate to
the government, these changes did not translate into a massive privatization of social property
lands (Siembieda, 1996; Jones and Pisa, 2000; Olivera, 2005). In fact, and according to the
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projections made by the Program of Certification of Ejido Rights and Urban Plots Titling
(PROCEDE), the incorporation of social land to urban development in the last 16 years should be
evaluated as modest (Siembieda, 1996; Olivera, 2005). Furthermore, new forms of illegality
emerged as more sophisticated mechanisms for sale adapted to the new legal and administrative
frameworks were developed. Although this phenomenon has not been precisely quantified, it is a
known fact that ancient informal practices persist, making a significant contribution to the
uncontrolled expansion of the main Mexican cities.
In this sense, this research aims to address two fundamental questions:
1. Why the level of land privatization was much lower than expected in urban ejidos.
2. Why informal land markets persist when ejidatarios have the option to privatize and get a
higher price in the formal land market.
Factors traditionally argued by the researchers who have studied the impact of the reforms on
urban ejidos include the inadequacy of procedures for land privatization, which are extremely
bureaucratic and time-consuming, making the incorporation of social land to the formal market
economically unattractive (Siembieda, 1996; Jones and Ward, 1998; Jones and Pisa, 2000; Maya,
2004; Olivera, 2005); the insufficient supply of housing oriented to the urban poor, who are
obligated to satisfy their needs in the informal market (Siembieda, 1996; Olivera, 2005;
Schteingart and Salazar, 2006; Iracheta, 2006); the existence of an institutional framework that in
some sense provides incentives for the irregular sales of ejido land (Jones and Ward, 1998;
Olivera, 2001); and the traditional reluctance of ejidatarios to deal with public institutions and
private investors (Siembieda, 1996; Aguado and Hernandez, 2001; Maya, 2004; Olivera, 2005).
City Growth and Community-Owned Land in Mexico City I Introduction
Although all of these factors are valid to explain why the majority of the ejidos did not participate
in the process of privatization and incorporation of social property land into the urban
development, they are not enough to entirely explain this phenomenon. In this sense, this
research aims to demonstrate that there are three additional important factors, not considered in
the existent literature on ejido issues, which enlighten the behavior observed in urban ejidos from
1992 to date:
The hindering effect of participation and transparency. Privatization requires the
fulfillment of a long and often complicated process comprised of three steps, all of which
need the sanction of two thirds of the ejido assembly in order to be approved. This research
aims to prove that process requirements that involve community participation and
transparency of information are a hindrance to privatization and subsequent incorporation of
social land to the formal market. In this sense, the common explanation for this phenomenon
argues that the development of participatory processes in ejidos might rooted in a collective
action problem, in which the more stakeholders are involved in the decision-making process,
the more complicated it becomes.
However, what makes the case of the ejidos interesting is the fact that never-ending
discussions about whether or not to privatize the social land are not the only outcome of
participatory processes. In fact, agrarian communities have experienced a significant increase
in the number of disputes between ejidatarios about the size and limits of parcels and
communal areas, an issue that was under control in the past simply because it was not
publicly discussed, and because the government managed any conflictive situation within the
ejidos. In such a context, transactions in the informal land market are simpler and faster, and
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the possible disputes are discussed between the stakeholders directly involved, not by the
entire community.
In addition, this research challenges the extended idea that reforms increased the relevance of
the entire community in the administration of the ejido. In fact, rather than increasing the
relevance of the ejido assembly, the reforms enhanced the power of ejido leaders, who
usually are reluctant to privatize the land because it could mean the dispersion of their
constituencies, and the loss of the economic and political benefits of the special status the
have within the communities.
The democratization of clientelism. Due to their importance, ejidos have always been an
attractive constituency for the political power. The process of democratization that began in
Mexico in the mid nineties was far from able to abolish the clientelistic practices developed
throughout more than 70 years by the de facto single party political system. In fact, the
agrarian realm saw a mutation of the model, characterized by the fragmentation of the
stakeholders involved in it. Hence, ejidos and comunidades experienced on the one hand the
multiplication of public institutions in charge of ejido issues, and on the other hand, the
enhancement of the influence of new leaders, and the appearance of many interest groups
within the communities that struggle for the control of the ejido and the subsequent access to
political authorities. In this context, social land privatization acts as a disincentive because
keeping the communal status of ejidos provides them easy access to politicians, services and
subsidies, a privilege that most of the private landowners do not have.
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Literature shows that Mexico is a highly politicized country in which state has traditionally
intervened in the social organizations, so its relationship with agrarian communities would
not be an exception. Nevertheless, ejidos are the most important and influential organizations
in rural and peri-urban areas, and land ownership is the element that differentiates them from
other groups. In fact, ejidos are probably the only social organizations in Mexico that are
attached to a specific territory, so the best way to exercise political influence in the ejido
realm is by keeping the communities together, something extremely difficult when land is
privatized. This is one of the reasons that explain why the state displays the ambiguous
behavior of on the one hand promoting privatization and incorporation of ejido land to urban
development, and on the other hand keeping the package of benefits (subsidies, tax
exemption, and grants) that acts as an incentive for preserving the communal status.
Cultural attachment to land. More than commodities that might be transacted in the land
market, ejidos should be considered as social spaces in which land possession is intrinsically
related to the preservation of their identity as communities that are the heirs of the values that
inspired the Mexican Revolution. This condition allows ejidatarios to enjoy a special status in
the Mexican society, translated into preferential treatment given by politicians, public
institutions, and the rest of the population.
It might be pointed out that ejidatarios' attitude'is not unique since many communities
consider that their cultural roots are attached to the place they work and live in. Also, ejidos
have historically sold their land informally, so their behavior would not be coherent with the
supposed cultural relationship with territory.
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However, in the case of ejidos the cultural attachment is not necessarily related to the
occupancy of land but to its ownership. In this sense, this research proposes to demonstrate
that one of the explanations for the permanence of the informal market is the fact that it
allows ejidatarios to let others use their lands while retaining its tenure. For them,
privatization of land not only means the end of the ejido as a social entity, but also the
disappearance of the last vestige of the Revolution and its ideals.
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Methodology
The research uses both quantitative and qualitative approaches. The first aims to measure the real
impact of the reforms in the urban land market in order to establish the levels of land
privatization in practice and how the real estate market was affected by the incorporation of
social land after the constitutional reforms of 1992. The second approach explores the factors that
explain the outcomes of the reforms, both at the ejido and urban levels.
The case of the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City (MAMC) will be examined in order to
evaluate the three hypotheses presented in the previous chapter. The MAMC was elected as a
subject of analysis because it is the place where there was more pressure to incorporate new lands
into the urban expansion, and where the phenomenon of illegal urbanization of ejido land has
historically been expressed most dramatically.
The quantitative analysis includes the 16 delegaciones of the DF and the 59 conurbated
Municipalities of the States of Mexico and Hidalgo that constitute the periphery of the MAMC.
This approach will allow the evaluation of whether the urban processes developed in social lands
have had the same characteristics in different urban zones with different institutional frameworks
for land privatization.
The analysis of the factors that influence privatization of ejido lands will be based on two case
studies: ejido San Gregorio Atlapulco, located in the delegaci6n of Xochimilco, and ejido San
Nicol-is Totolapan, located in the delegaci6n of La Magdalena Contreras. They were selected
because they represent two different behaviors regarding irregular land sale and privatization. On
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the one hand, San Nicolas could be considered the symbol of the informal land market in the
MAMC. In fact, all of the expressions of irregularity can be found there (invasions, irregular
sales, fraudulent expropriations, etc.). On the other hand, in spite of the significant pressure for
selling the land for urban purposes, San Gregorio has traditionally rejected doing that, being the
exception of Xochimilco, an area in which four of the six ejidos that once existed have already
disappeared. In addition, both ejidos have different historical backgrounds, which helps identify
common patterns to explain the behavior of urban ejidos in urban expansion and land
privatization.
Structure
The first chapter of this thesis describes the legal framework that regulates land tenure in Mexico,
emphasizing the historical importance of Article 27 in urban development and why it was utilized
for political intervention in agrarian communities. The chapter depicts the situation of ejidos by
the early nineteen nineties and why the government of Salinas de Gortari determined to introduce
drastic changes to the Constitution that were oriented to give the agrarian communities more
autonomy to administrate their lands.
Chapters 2 and 3 evaluate the success of the reforms to Article 27 regarding the level of social
land privatization and the incorporation of land to the formal real estate market in the MAMC.
The assessment is done according to four parameters:
* Total area delimitated and certified by the PROCEDE in the MAMC since the
implementation of the reforms in 1992.
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* Total area privatized in the MAMC through the endowment of land for mercantile societies
and the adoption of full ownership (dominio pleno) of certificated parcels.
* Total area of privatized lands incorporated into the urban development of the MAMC.
* Housing demand and supply in the MAMC.
The first three parameters are evaluated according to data publicly available in the Register and
Historical Record of Agrarian Communities (PHINA), developed by the National Agrarian
Register (RAN). The assessment of the privatization process also takes into account the
information provided by Maya's investigation (2004) on land market and privatization in the
MAMC. In addition, data to examine land and housing markets was obtained from the Urban
Development Office of the State of Mexico, the Secretariat of Urban Development and Housing
(SEDUVI), and the studies carried out by Iracheta (2001, 2005) and Maya (2004).
However, it is worth mentioning that since this research addresses issues related to informality
and illegality in land uses, the data available about these topics is not very reliable. In fact, it is
very difficult to find adequate information about aspects, such as the price of land in informal
markets or the number of people who live in irregular settlements located in ejido lands in the
MAMC. In this case, information about informality was mainly obtained by interviewing
ejidatarios, public officials, and researchers.
Chapter 4 presents the case studies utilized in this research: ejidos San Gregorio Atlapulco and
San Nicoldis Totolapan.
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Chapter 5 addresses the effect of participation in privatization processes and the persistence of
informal land markets in ejidos. The indicators to be examined in this section are the
characteristics of the requisites established in the procedures for social land privatization, their
comparison with the typical transactions in the informal sector, and the occurrence of conflicts
within the communities over the discussion of land privatization.
The analysis is based on attendance to periodical community meetings for two months in ejido
San Gregorio Atlapulco, interviews with ejidatarios, ejido leaders and public officials, and the
review of literature about community disputes produced after the reforms were passed.
Chapter 6 deals with the democratization of clientelism within ejidos and how it hampers the goal
of privatization and the incorporation of social land into urban development. The analysis
involves the mapping of both the public institutions that address ejido issues and groups that have
emerged within the communities, and their comparison to the relationship that did exist between
government, politicians and ejidatarios before 1992. Examination was done according to
interviews to ejido leaders of San Gregorio and San Nicolais, political authorities, and officials of
public institutions in charge of ejido affairs.
Finally, chapter 7 shows the relationship between the cultural attachment to land and the
permanence of the informal market of ejido land in the MAMC. This chapter identifies the
elements that comprise the ejido culture and explains why they are attached to the land that they
own. The analysis compares the social characteristics of the ejidos that already have sold part of
their land with those that have refused to sell theirs. As in the previous two chapters, the analysis
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is based on interviews with ejidatarios, attendance to periodical community meetings, and a
review of literature about this issue.
The interviews took place in the months of August and September 2007 and January 2008. In the
case of the ejidos, the interviewees were members of the boards of authorities (Comisarfas),
leaders recognized by the community, and ejidatarios randomly selected in the case studies. In
addition, the research considered the attendance to ejido assemblies and ordinary meetings held
in San Gregorio Atlapulco during that period. The research also involved meetings and
interviews with public officials from the following institutions (Spanish acronyms are indicated
in parentheses):
* Secretariat of the Agrarian Reform (SRA)
* Agrarian National Register (RAN)
* Commission for Land Tenure Regularization (CORETT)
* Program of Certification of Ejido Rights and Urban Plots Titling (PROCEDE)
* Secretariat of Agrarian Issues of the Federal District
* Trust National Fund for Ejido Promotion (FIFONAFE)
* Commission of Natural Resources (CORENA)
* Secretariat of Urban Development and Housing (SEDUVI)
* Delegaci6n of Xochimilco
* Delegaci6n of La Magdalena Contreras
* Balam Consultores
Finally, it is necessary to mention that the identity of the interviewees is confidential, and the
names utilized in this research are fictitious.
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Chapter 1
Article 27 and Urban Development in Mexico
The contemporary concept of ejido refers both to the communities of peasants that have received
land from the government for its exploitation, and to the land itself. Its origins in Mexico can be
found in the Laws of the Indies (Leyes de Indias) implemented by the Spanish conquistadores in
1523. They defined ejidos as "lands placed in the exit of the villages that are communally owned
by the inhabitants of those villages. In them people get lumber, spend their free time, and graze
cattle without damaging the others."6 Nevertheless, land trusts were common in Mexico even
before the arrival of the Spanish conquerors; in fact, a big part of the Aztecs' agriculture was
produced on community-owned lands. However, their use almost disappeared in the following
centuries, being replaced by large haciendas owned by few landlords. The agrarian reform
implemented after the Mexican Revolution, which was led by many peasant leaders, recovered
this traditional form of land tenure that was then consolidated during the presidency of Laizaro
Cdrdenas (1934 - 1940). Since then, the endowment or restitution of lands benefited more than
3.5 million people grouped in more than 27 thousand ejidos all over the country, which occupy
half of the Mexican territory. The ejidatarios, their family members, and other people who live
6 Leyes de Indias, Issue II, Book IV, Title VII, third edition. Quoted by Unanue, Manuel. La Reforma alArticulo 27
Constitucional", presented in "Mesas del Diilogo para un Poliftica del Campo," M6xico, 2003. Translation by
Rodrigo Diaz
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within ejido boundaries, called avecindados7, are one quarter of the total national population
(Olivera, 2005).
As was mentioned above, the legal framework of agrarian communities was defined by Article 27
of the Constitution promulgated in 1927. This article, which might be considered the base of the
economic and social model promoted by the Revolution (Azuela, 1989; Gordillo, 2007),
recognized the right that agrarian communities had to exploit the lands they held in common,
obligating the state to endow lands to all of the landless peasants, and also restituting territories to
all of the villages that lost them after 1856. In that year, the Law of Desamortization of Dead
Hands (Ley de Desamortizaci6n de Manos Muertas) was passed. It had the purpose of depriving
the Catholic Church and some indigenous communities of the lands they owned, which were
considered excessive. This law translated into the loss of thousands of hectares from peasant
communities as they were appropriated by a small group of landowners (de Unanue, 2003). This
was one of the main arguments used by the revolutionaries to justify the insurrection of 1910.
However, the Constitution explicitly subordinated land property to the interests of the entire
nation. Thus, the first paragraph of Article 27 indicated that "ownership of the lands and waters
within the boundaries of the national territory is vested originally in the Nation, which has had,
and has, the right to transmit title thereof to private persons, thereby constituting private
property."8 This idea was enhanced in the third paragraph of the same Article, which stated that
7 The law defines avecindados as "Mexicans, adults, who have had residence in ejido lands for more than a year, and
have been recognized either by the ejido assembly or by the respective agrarian court." Procuraduria Agraria,
Glosario de T6rminos Juridicos Agrarios 2007.
8 Text translated from Constitucidn Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Trigesima Quinta Edici6n, 1967,
Editorial Porrua, S. A., M6xico, D. F. Originally published by the Pan American Union, General Secretariat,
Organization of American States, Washington, D.C., 1968. Available at
http://www.ilstu.edu/class/hist263/docs/1917const.html
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"the Nation shall at all times have the right to impose on private property such limitations as the
public interest may demand, as well as the right to regulate the utilization of natural resources
which are susceptible of appropriation, in order to conserve them and to ensure a more equitable
distribution of public wealth." 9
These terms meant that social property was in an ambiguous situation in terms of land tenure
because they established that ejidatarios had the right only to usufruct land whose ownership
belonged to the whole nation. In other words, ejidatarios could economically exploit and live in
the land, but they could not enjoy all of the benefits of its full ownership. However, and as some
authors point out (Warman, 1994; Gordillo, 2007), the insecurity and precariousness generated
by Article 27 were not accidental; they reflected the intent of creating a system in which the state
exercised strict political control over the agricultural land and the communities who work and
live there.
Article 27 and State Intervention in Agrarian Communities
Article 27 made it clear that the ultimate purpose of agrarian reform was not only to provide land
to the historically displaced sectors in Mexico. The aspiration of many of the revolutionary
ideologues to establish a peculiar political system in which all of the productive and social areas
were controlled by the State was implicit in the Constitution. Ejidos would not be the exception.
Thus, Article 27 and its related laws set the legal framework to guarantee the effectiveness of
governmental intervention in all of the issues related to the ejido realm, from the endowment of
lands to the internal organization and administration of the agrarian communities. In this sense,
9 Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Ibid.
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and despite the fact that the communities were theoretically the landholders, in practice their
capacity for making decisions about internal affairs was extremely limited (Warman, 1994; de
Janvry, Gordillo et al. 1999).
In this context, the most important resolution considered in Article 27 pointed out that social land
would be inalienable, imprescriptible and non-transferable. In other words, ejido land could not
be sold, rented, transferred, used as collateral for a loan, or be subject to taxation, because its
purpose was to generate livelihood for the members of the different agrarian communities
(Sanchez, 1995). In addition, the hiring of paid external labor was absolutely prohibited within
ejido boundaries. This series of administrative and organizational prohibitions, which totaled 11,
converted ejidos into institutions with null autonomy, unable to adapt to changing contexts (de
Unanue, 2003).10
The Agrarian Code, which addresses the issues of internal administration regulation of agrarian
communities, was also consistent with the purpose of guaranteeing the governmental intervention
in the ejidos, providing a series of mechanisms that can be divided into three clearly defined lines
of action (Gordillo, 2007):
o1 The eleven restrictions identified by de Unanue (2003) specified that ejido lands:
1. Were inalienable
2. Were perpetual
3. Were non-seizable
4. Were not transferable
5. Could not be used as a mortgage
6. Could not be rented
7. Were not taxable
8. Could not be endowed
9. Could not be exploited in aparceria (a type of contract between landowner and renter)
10. Could not be exploited indirectly
11. Could not be exploited by foreigners
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* Legalization and supervision of internal processes of decision-making and election of
community representatives. All of the decisions taken by the ejido assembly needed the
agreement of the governmental institutions in order to be implemented. The State also had to
approve the election by the community of the three members of the board of authorities of the
ejido, called Comisaria Ejidal," who could also be removed of their charges by the
government.
* Conflict arbitration. All of the disputes between ejidos, between ejidatarios and neighbors,
and between members of the same ejidos had to be arbitrated by governmental institutions
specifically created for that purpose.
* Financial control. Production of agrarian communities was economically planned and
controlled by the government. In fact, ejidos could only take loans from public institutions. In
addition, the state was the main buyer of their production. The lack of operational flexibility
was so significant that even credits assigned for individual parcels needed the approval of the
Comisaria Ejidal. In this case, the entire ejido guaranteed the loan payment, usually using
production as collateral.
This system was supported by an enormous apparatus of public institutions, all of them
controlled by the same party, that were in charge of the direct control of ejidos. These institutions
many times provided credits, grants and subsidies to the communities; however, financial aid was
usually tied to the political subordination to the government by the ejido members, a situation
" The elected authorities are the three members of Comisaria Ejidal: the Commissioner (Comisario), the Secretary,
and the Treasurer. In addition, three members of the Committee of Internal Control (Comitg de Vigilancia) are
elected. They are in charge of the accountability of Comisaria's behavior.
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that created a strong clientelistic relationship between communities and government since the
first years of the post-revolution.
Ejido Context in 1992: A System in a Deep Crisis
By the early nineties the outcome of the agrarian policies developed by the government was far
from the original purposes promoted by the revolutionaries in the first decades of the past
century.
Firstly, the government was facing the serious problem of not being able to carry out what was
stated in fraction X of Article 27, which obligated the state to provide land to all those landless
peasants that made a request for it. The Mexico of 1990 was not the same as that of the
revolutionary days, when most of the population lived in rural areas and there were enough lands
to share out among all the agrarian communities of the country. Mexican population had
increased 4.9 times in 60 years, from 16.5 million in 1930 to 81.2 million in 1990 (Table 1).12 In
this sense, the calculations made by Warman (1994) in the early nineties indicated that, according
to the number of landless communities in existence by that time, it was necessary to count on 523
million hectares to satisfy their possible requests. Needless to say, this was impossible since the
total area of Mexican territory is just 196 million hectares.
From an economic perspective, Mexican agriculture was experiencing a severe crisis. Productive
performance in ejidos was extremely low, technologies utilized were obsolete, and most of the
production was exclusively for self consumption (de Janvry, Gordillo, et al., 1999). Therefore,
and despite the fact that one quarter of the Mexican population lived within ejido boundaries, the
12 Source: INEGI, http://www.inegi.gob.mx
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value of what they produced was only 1/13 of the GDP (Warman, 2003). In addition, the
processes of rapid urbanization, internal and external migration, and the advanced age of most of
the ejidatarios due to the characteristics of the succession system established for the agrarian
communities, produced that many of the parcels, especially in urban and peri-urban areas, were
abandoned.
Nevertheless, the most serious of all of the consequences was the significant loss of ejido land
due to invasions and illegal sales for urban purposes. As was mentioned above, for decades
ejidatarios developed all kind of mechanisms to evade the property and land use regulations
established in Article 27, the Agrarian Code and the General Law of Human Settlements
(LGAH). According to the data provided by RAN, by 1992 more than 16,000 hectares had been
expropriated by the Commission for Land Tenure Regularization (CORETT) to regularize
squatter settlements located in ejido land only in Mexico City'3 ; however, the irregularly
urbanized area in the Mexican capital was significantly larger. In addition, many of these
settlements were placed in environmentally protected areas, causing an irreversible damage to
flora, fauna and natural resources (Vargas and Martinez, 1999; PAOT, 2003; Schteingart and
Salazar, 2005).
As was pointed out previously, customers were usually low-income families who were not able
to afford housing in the formal market. However, agrarian communities also provided land for
the development of residential areas oriented to the wealthiest sectors, favored by a network of
corruption that involved ejidatario leaders, informal developers, public officials and political
authorities. They created the basis for the informal market that made it possible for thousands of
13 Source: Padr6n e Historial de Nficleos Agrarios. http://ran.gob.mex
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hectares to be available for urban expansion in the main Mexican cities (Azuela, 1989;
Schteingart, 1990).
A Second Agrarian Reform
Taking into account the scenario described above, the government led by President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari (1988 - 1994) passed a reform to Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution in
January 1992. This reform, the most radical implemented in the agrarian domain since 1917,
considered a substantial change in social property, giving ejidos and comunidades more
autonomy and flexibility to administrate their lands. This included the recognition of agrarian
community members as the legitimate owners of the land, replacing the legal figure of the
usufruct. The modifications proposed the dismantling of a big portion of the mechanisms for state
intervention in agrarian communities, which would mean a significant change in the type of
relationships that had been established between ejidos and government by then (Gordillo, 2007).
In general terms, the modifications introduced to Article 27 addressed 6 fundamental aspects:
* Endowment. The state is no longer responsible for the sharing out of land to new
communities due to the impossibility of doing this. In this sense, reforms to Article 27 end the
agrarian reform in Mexico.
* Land Ownership. The amended Article 27 recognizes agrarian communities as full owners
of the land in which they work and live, suppressing the ambiguous legal figure of usufruct of
land that belongs to the entire nation.
City Growth and Community-Owned Land in Mexico City I Article 27 and Urban Development in Mexico
* Land Property Concentration. The concentration of agricultural land in the hands of few
landowners is prohibited through the abolition of large estate (latifundios). The modified
article also points out that no ejidatario will be owner of more than 5 percent of the ejido of
which he or she is member.
* Mercantile societies. The creation of mercantile societies that own social land is permitted.
The amended Agrarian Code indicates that "ejidatarios and ejidos will be able to create ejido
joint-ventures, rural associations of collective interest, and any type of mercantile or civil
societies that are not prohibited by law, for the commercialization and transformation of
products, and for the provision of services oriented to improve the activities of ejidatarios." 14
* Internal Organization. It is established that the general assembly is the supreme organ of
authority in agrarian communities, whereas the Comisaria Ejidal is responsible for executing
the assembly's resolutions. This reform frees the ejido from state intervention in the internal
processes of decision-making and in the administration of the common properties.
* Agrarian Justice. The reform created the Agrarian Courts (Tribunales Agrarios) and the
Agrarian Attorney Office (Procuraduria Agraria) as independent institutions in charge of
dispute arbitration and justice administration in the agrarian realm.
The modifications related to land ownership and mercantile societies within ejidos are the most
relevant of the package of reforms, because they dismantled a large portion of the existing
administrative obstacles both to the productive exploitation of land and to its free administration
and commercialization. Thus, and in the scope of urban development, the ejidos were authorized
14 Agrarian Code, Article 50. Translated by Rodrigo Diaz.
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to formally participate in the land market, an area in which they had been informally involved
without receiving the benefits of the real value of urban land, and also causing a severe damage
to the structure of the cities after adding vast unplanned areas to the urban fabric.
Table 1. Mexican Population
Urban
Year Population Population % Urban % Rural
1930 16,552,722 5,540,631 33.47% 66.53%
1940 19,653,552 6,896,111 35.09% 64.91%
1950 25,791,017 10,983,483 42.59% 57.41%
1960 34,923,129 17,705,118 50.70% 49.30%
1970 48,225,238 28,308,556 58.70% 41.30%
1990 81,249,645 57,959,721 71.34% 28.66%
1995 91,158,290 67,003,515 73.50% 26.50%
2000 97,014,867 72,406,270 74.63% 25.37%
2005 103,263,388 78,987,743 76.49% 23.51%
Source: INEGI, Population and Housing Censuses
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Chapter 2
Delimitation, Certification, and Privatization of Ejido Land
The most important outgrowth of the institutions derived from the 1992 reforms was the Program
of Certification of Ejido Land Rights and Urban Plots Titling (PROCEDE), which had a mission
to "give juridical certainty to land tenure through the endowment of parcel rights certificates
and/or certificates of rights for the use of common lands, or both according to the case, and also
to give property titles to all of the individuals with rights who are members of the agrarian
communities that request them." 15
Participation in PROCEDE was voluntary, and communities needed the approval of two thirds of
the assemblies in order to be included on its register. It is important to mention that involvement
in PROCEDE did not mean the privatization of the social land, only the delimitation of the three
different types of land tenure that might exist within the ejido boundaries: common land, parcels,
and human settlement areas. The certification process involves a sequence of three stages,
evaluation, delimitation, and final agreement, and each one of them also needs the support of two
thirds of the assembly to be approved.
Regarding the areas assigned for human settlements, Article 63 of the Agrarian Code points out
that, like in the pre-reform times, they are inalienable, imprescriptible and non-seizeable.
15 PROCEDE, Definici6n y objetivos. Available at http://www.pa.gob.mx/procede. Translated from the original
Spanish by Rodrigo Diaz.
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In the case of common use lands, Article 73 of the Agrarian Code defines them as those
"assigned to provide livelihood for the communitarian life within the ejido."16 As in the case of
the human settlements, these lands are still inalienable, imprescriptible and non-seizeable after
the implementation of the reforms. Nevertheless, Article 75 of the same code indicates that "in
cases of evident usefulness for the ejido members, they will be able to transmit land tenure of
common use lands to mercantile or civil societies in which ejidatarios participate according to
the procedures established in the Article.""17
Finally, parcels are regulated by Article 76 of the Agrarian Code, which indicates that
"ejidatarios have the right of exploitation, use and usufruct of them." 18 However, these rights can
be sold to other ejidatarios or avecindados from the same community (Article 80). This does not
mean the privatization of the parcels, only the sale of the rights for using and economically
exploiting them. In this scenario, land ownership still belongs to the entire community.
However, what differentiates parcels to the common use lands and those assigned for human
settlements is the fact the Agrarian Code permits the full transformation in private property of the
first through the adoption of full ownership (dominio pleno) in the areas determined by the ejido
assembly (Article 81.) Once the assembly approves this procedure, the National Agrarian
Register (RAN) segregates them from the rest of the ejido, providing the respective property title
to the landowner. Thus, these parcels no longer have a relationship with the ejido, and they have
the same legal status as the rest of private properties in Mexico (Article 82).
16 Translated from the original Spanish by Rodrigo Diaz.
17 Translated from the original Spanish by Rodrigo Diaz..
18 Translated from the original Spanish by Rodrigo Diaz..
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Once dominio pleno is given to a parcel, its owner can freely trade it in the formal land market,
and thusly can be utilized for urban purposes if it is permitted by the respective land use
regulations.
The Incorporation of Social Lands into Urban Development
After examining the reforms to Article 27 and Agrarian Code, it becomes clear that they were not
only oriented to increase the productivity of agrarian communities by the dismantling of a series
of mechanisms of state control and bureaucratic barriers that impede them from becoming
masters of their own destiny. Implicit in these modifications was the purpose of liberalizing the
land market, especially in urban areas. These changes recognized the right of every ejidatario to
be a participant in the urban development process and allowed them to take advantage of the
added value that urban expansion might generate in their lands. Thus, the modifications allowed a
major increase in the stock of urban land for the development of real-estate projects. Legal urban
land had become scarce by the early nineties, significantly rising its value. Therefore, both
government and private real estate developers desperately needed to increase the stock of land in
order to supply the needs of a demand that otherwise would have been fulfilled by the informal
sector.
According to these circumstances, in 1996 the federal government created the Program of
Incorporation of Social Land to the Urban Development (PISO), which aimed to "promote the
controlled and sustainable development in the cities through the inclusion of apt ejido and
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communal lands to the urban and real-estate development."' 19 In this sense, PISO functioned as a
coordinating entity between the three levels of government (federal, state, and local) and the
agrarian communities in order to facilitate the incorporation of social land to satisfy the cities'
requirements of housing and infrastructure.
The Implementation of PROCEDE and its Omission in the DF
PROCEDE was implemented in the 32 states of the Federation but not in the Federal District
(DF). The reasons behind this decision are not completely clear, and no official document
explaining it is publicly available. In fact, those who were interviewed for this thesis project
argued three different reasons to explain this omission:
* Political reasons, based on the importance of the DF in the national context, elicited an
exclusive administrative and legal status that differentiates it from the rest of the country.
However, this argument is weak because the Governor and the 16 mayors (delegados) of the
DF were all members of the same political party and were directly designated by the
President of the Federation by the time the reforms were passed.
* By 1992, ejidos in the DF had only 12,670 hectares of land shared out in 46 communities,
which represented an extremely low percentage of the national area of social property lands.
Thus, it was not worthwhile to implement a Program to accommodate such a small number of
cases. However, and although ejido lands in the DF represent less than 5% of the total social
19 Programa de Incorporaci6n de Suelo Social (PISO). Estudios Agrarios No 7, abril - junio 1997. Available at
http://www.pa.gob.mx/publica/revista7/piso.pdf. Translated from the original Spanish by Rodrigo Diaz..
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property lands in the ZMCM, their relevance is significant, because they include those who
face more pressure for urban expansion within their boundaries.
Implementing PROCEDE in the DF would have left the door open for its total urbanization,
including the 59% of the territory that is subject to environmental protection, and which is
mainly owed by ejidos and comunidades. However, and as it was pointed out above, the
purpose of PROCEDE was only the certification of ejido rights; thus, there is no direct cause-
effect relationship between this procedure and the privatization of land for their incorporation
to urban development.
According to these reasons, the exclusion of PROCEDE in the DF does not ostensibly make
sense. It discriminated against an already vulnerable group of ejidatarios who needed a stronger
delimitation of their lands in order to regulate the urban expansion and to preserve all of the areas
assigned for conservation or agricultural exploitation. Worthy of mention is that ejidos and
comunidades in the DF have the same rights, stated both in Article 27 and Agrarian Code, which
the rest of the Mexican agrarian communities also have. However, the lack of a public institution
that promotes and facilitates their ability to exercise their rights situates the ejidos in the DF in
more disadvantaged condition than the other agrarian communities in the rest of the country.
Land Certification by PROCEDE
By December 2006, when the final results of the Program were announced, 28,863 agrarian
communities, which represent 96% of the national total, had voluntarily decided to participate in
it. Among them, 27,752 (92.6% of the national universe) had delimitated their lands, which
translated in the sharing out of more than 5 million certificates for 25.2 million of hectares of
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individual parcels. In addition, the 1,942 certificates for common use lands represent nearly 60
million hectares. Considering the 324,000 hectares assigned for human settlements within ejidos
and comunidades boundaries, PROCEDE delimitated and certified more than 85 million hectares,
benefiting a diverse group of 4,259,777 people, including ejidatarios, comuneros, posesionarios
and avecindados.20
In the case of Mexico City, the process of social land certification delimitated 256,323 hectares
divided in 160,461 hectares assigned for parcels (63%); 86,728 hectares assigned to common use
lands (34%); and 7,627 hectares assigned to human settlement areas (3%). In the latter case, the
settlers received property titles, so their plots were segregated from the ejido.
After the certification, 8,687 hectares of parcels were privatized after the adoption of dominio
pleno. Thus, by April 2008 the tenure subdivision in the ejidos of the MAMC is the following:
Graph 1. Social Property in the MAMC (hectares)
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Only one of the ejidos of the DF delimitated and certified its territory (San Mateo Tlatenango) in
order to endow lands for the creation of 3 mercantile societies. Since PROCEDE was not
implemented in the DF, the procedure was done by the Office of Agrarian Issues of the DF. In
the case of the conurbated municipalities of the States of Mexico and Hidalgo, 33 of 332 ejidos
did not participate in PROCEDE. The total area of these ejidos is 21,901 hectares, which
represent 8.3% of the ejido land in the MAMC. 21
Three Ways to Incorporate Social Land into Urban Development
After the reforms of 1992, there are three ways to incorporate social land to urban development in
Mexico: expropriation, endowment of communal lands to mercantile societies, and privatization
of parcels through declaration of dominio pleno. The impact of each one of these options is
examined in order to evaluate the circumstances in which they have been utilized and whether or
not they have been successful in the purpose of incrementing the land available for urban
expansion in the MAMC.
The Expropriation of Ejido Land and the Role of CORETT
When the Constitution of 1917 stated that all the land and water in Mexico belong to the entire
Nation, it provided the legal framework to consider the land of agrarian communities as areas
available for the implementation of works oriented to satisfy public interest through
expropriation.
21 Source: Registro Agrario Nacional, Padr6n e Historial de Niicleos Agrarios (PHINA). The reasons argued to
explain why these ejidos did not participate in PROCEDE are the existence of boundary disputes with other
communities; the invasion of lands; pending lawsuits in agrarian courts and legal conflicts with other ejidos or
neighbors; internal problems; and the voluntary refusal to participate in the case of two ejidos (Santiago Tepetlaxco
and Nicolas Romero, located in the municipalities of Naucalpan and Nicolds Romero respectively).
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According to PHINA, there were 941 land expropriations from 1934 to 2007 in the ZMCM. The
41,613 hectares expropriated are more than one quarter of the current urbanized metropolitan
area. Nevertheless, not all of the lands expropriated have been incorporated into urban
development (some areas were assigned for works like oleoducts, antennas, or artificial lakes), so
it is almost impossible to accurately assess the areas finally used for urban expansion.
Table 3 shows that 72.5% of the expropriations took place before 1992. It is also notable that the
differences between DF and the conurbated municipalities that are part of the MACM are
significant in this aspect. Thus, 47% of the total areas expropriated before 1992 were located in
the DF. However, DF's participation in the total areas segregated in the ZMCM has declined to
only 14.5% since that time. This is a direct reflection of the urban expansion in the peripheral
areas of the cities, but is also a consequence of the increase in the cost of expropriations, which
currently have to be compensated according to the market value of the properties. In the case of
the DF, this value is much higher than in the surrounding municipalities. A direct outcome of this
is the fact that the average area expropriated in the DF decreased from 75.77 hectares in the
period 1934 - 1991 to 33.84 hectares between 1992 and 2007 (table 4). In the case of the
conurbated municipalities, in the same periods the average expropriated area increased from
31.79 to 48.58 hectares. In other words, the large scale expropriations moved from the central
zones to the periphery, where land is still available in large lots at a low price. In the case of the
DF, the government currently tries to minimize both the number and area of expropriations there
because the cost of these procedures has significantly increased in the last 16 years.
The data available also shows that, at least in the case of the MAMC, it is not clear if a pattern
exists to explain the number of expropriations and areas segregated from ejido lands throughout
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time. However, it is noticeable that the largest number of hectares segregated from ejido land
coincides with the term of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988 - 1994), at the same time
that reforms to Article 27 were being discussed (Graph 2).
Table 2. Number of Expropriations in the MAMC
Conurbated
D.F. Municipalities MAMC
Expropriations before 1992 187 504 691
Expropriations after 1992 49 201 250
Total 236 705 941
Source: Registro Agrario Nacional. Padr6n e Historial de NCicleos Agrarios (PHINA)
Table 3. Areas Expropriated in the MAMC (hectares)
Conurbated
D.F. Municipalities MAMC
Expropriations before 1992 14,168.9508 16,021.1429 30,190.0937
Expropriations after 1992 1,658.0460 9,765.0316 11,423.0776
Total 15,826.9968 25,786.1745 41,613.1713
Source: Registro Agrario Nacional. Padr6n e Historial de Nucleos Agrarios (PHINA)
Table 4. Average Area of Expropriations in the MAMC (hectares)
Conurbated
D.F. Municipalities MAMC
Expropriations before 1992 75.7698 31.7880 43.6904
Expropriations after 1992 33.8377 48.5822 45.6923
Total 67.0635 36.5761 44.2223
Source: Registro Agrario Nacional. Padr6n e Historial de NOcleos Agrarios (PHINA)
Graph 2. Areas Expropriated in the MAMC
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By the mid seventies the high number of irregular settlements spread out on social property land
reached a magnitude that made it necessary to regularize land tenure on them as the only way to
integrate these informal areas into the urban fabric. In this case, regularization meant the
segregation from ejidos and comunidades of all of those areas invaded or illegally sold,
transforming them into private property regulated by a different legal and administrative
framework. That is why the government of Luis Echeverria (1970 - 1976) decided to create the
Commission for the Regularization of Land Tenure (CORETT) in 1976 with the purpose to
"regularize urban land tenure in those settlements located both in federal and in social property
land (ejidos and comunidades)."22
16,126 of the 41,613 hectares expropriated in the MAMC are part of the land tenure
regularization process nationally carried out by CORETT since 1976.23 However, these
expropriations do not necessarily correspond to all of the irregular settlements located within
ejido boundaries. All of those settlements located in areas in which urban development is
prohibited are precluded from being regulated by CORETT.
As table 6 shows, two thirds of the expropriations led by CORETT in the MAMC took place
before 1992. In this sense, it is interesting to see that between 1976 and 1991 the total area
expropriated in the DF was almost the same as the total area expropriated in the conurbated
municipalities. However, since 1992 most of the work developed by CORETT has been focused
on the peripheral municipalities, which include 76% of all of the expropriations executed since
then. This fact would confirm that in the last decades, the informal land market has moved from
22 CORETT, http://corett.gob.mx. Translated from the original Spanish by Rodrigo Diaz..
23 Source: PHINA, http://www.ran.gob.mx
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the DF to the periphery, where land is still available and affordable for the lowest-income sectors
of the MAMC.
Unfortunately, there is no available data about the age of each of the regularized informal
settlements, rendering it impossible to establish whether or not they were founded prior 1992.
However, there was consensus among the interviewees who work in public institutions that
informal urban expansion within ejidos is still a common practice in most of the agrarian
communities of the MAMC, especially those located in the conurbated municipalities of the
States of Mexico and Hidalgo.
Table 5. Regularization of Informal Settlements within Ejido Land
Conurbated
D.F. Municipalities MAMC
Regularization CORETT before 1992 5,263.1518 5,490.1356 10,753.2874
Regularization CORETT after 1992. 1,284.6455 4,088.9588 5,373.6042
Regularization PROCEDE 0.0000 6,716.1575 6,716.1575
Total 6,547.7972 16,295.2519 22,843.0491
Source: Registro Agrario Nacional. Padr6n e Historial de NWicleos Agrarios (PHINA)
Endowment of Ejido Land to Mercantile Societies (Joint-Ventures)
Regarding the endowment of certified common use lands to mercantile societies, there is no
doubt that the outcome of this mechanism for land liberalization is well below what it was
originally expected by the promoters of the constitutional reforms to Article 27. Thus, and despite
that the creation of joint-ventures was the way the government preferred to incorporate social
property land to the urban development (Olivera, 2005), only 40,893 hectares from ejidos and
comunidades have been provided at the national level for the creation of mercantile societies with
private investors. In fact, almost half of this area, 20,411 hectares, belonged to the ejido Pich,
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located in the State of Campeche, though those hectares were not even assigned for urban
development, but instead for the creation of a society aimed to develop projects related to
agriculture and forest.24
In the case of MAMC, only four ejidos, one in the DF and three in the State of Mexico, have
chosen to participate in joint-ventures. The area assigned by all of them for the development of
private projects is 428.82 hectares, which represent only 0.1% of the ejido land that did exist in
the MAMC by 1992. Three of the newly created societies are oriented to the development of
residential projects oriented to high-income households, whereas the other society was created for
the development of an industrial area (Table 6).
Table 6. Participation in Ejido Mercantile Societies in the MAMC
State DF MWxico MWxico M6xico
Municipality Cuajimalpa Cuautitln Izcalli Cuautitlin Izcalli Texcoco
San Mateo San Francisco Santiago
Ejido Tlaltenango Tepojaco La Piedad Cuautlalpan
Endowed Area 116.8740 220.1316 55.2237 54.9848
Residential - Golf
Purpose Course Residential Residential Industrial
3 societies, in which
% of Shares share participation
Assigned to varies between 10
Ejidatarios and 48% 27.00% 40.00% 30.00%
Source: Maya (2004) and Registro Agrario Nacional. Padr6n e Historial de NOcleos Agrarios
There are three basic reasons that explain the low level of endowment of ejido lands for the
formation of mercantile societies:
The endowment process is usually long and highly complex. In this sense, it is also necessary
to consider that most of the public institutions are not prepared to support the implementation
24 Procuradurfa Agraria, information available at http:/lwww.pa.gob.mxlvisitador/num60/campeche.htm
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of societies that combine private and social capitals, and which organization and
administration significantly differ from the rest of the private companies (Olivera, 2005).
The ejidatarios' distrust towards the private sector. This is based on the inequality on the
structure of the ejido mercantile societies, expressed by the fact that agrarian communities
cannot hold more than 50% of the shares of the societies. Thus, these societies can be easily
controlled by the private investors, who not only have the administration and finance
knowledge that ejidos lack, but also can take advantage of the favorable status they have in
the administration boards of the societies (Maya, 2004; Olivera, 2005). In fact, and as many
of the interviewees pointed out, it is publicly known that fraudulent acts against ejidatarios
are a common practice in the few ejido mercantile societies that do exist. Therefore, a
perception held by some scholars (Jones and Pisa, 2000; Maya, 2004) is that risks and
benefits are not equally shared in this class of joint-ventures, which require a more balanced
administrative structure in order to be attractive for the agrarian communities. Illustrative are
the opinions expressed by Clemente Angeles, Commissioner of ejido San Mateo Tlatenango,
located in the Delegaci6n of Cuajimalpa, DF, which contributed through expropriation and
land endowment with 226 of the 250 hectares of Santa Fe, an enormous real estate project
comprised by office buildings and high-end residential areas:
"We have always been damaged; we have endowed 116 hectares to Santa Fe, Rio Santa Fe
and Santa Fe Golf Course. They told us we were going to be partners, and in the end of the
day they left us off the business." 25
25 El Universal, August 7, 2007. Translated from the original Spanish by Rodrigo Diaz. The article indicates that
ejido San Mateo Tlaltenango had agreed a price of 2,000 per square meter for the expropriation of an area assigned
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Distrust from the private sector towards ejidos, who are perceived as problem and unreliable
partners. In fact, experience demonstrates that reaching agreements with ejido communities is
an extremely difficult and time-consuming process, and these agreements can be easily
reversed at the behest of the ejido assembly. As Jones and Pisa (2000) point out, "private
developers appear to have been constantly frustrated by the apparent inability of ejidos to take
simple majority decisions and the ejidatarios belief that all decisions can be reversed."
Declaration of Land Full Ownership (Dominio Pleno)
According to PHINA, 8,687 hectares have been disaggregated from ejido communities in the
MAMC by the declaration of dominio pleno of parcels previously delimitated and certified by
PROCEDE. Although Mexico City is the place where more pressure exists for the incorporation
of new land to urban expansion, and thusly land price is higher than in the rest of the country, the
level of land privatization between 1992 and 2007 should be considered as modest, reaching only
5.4% of the total of certified parcels and 3.3% of the ejido land that did exist in the MAMC by
1992. Thus, by year 2000 it was expected that ejidos provided 11,100 new hectares for urban
expansion in the MAMC (Seti6n, Mora et al., 1999). However, and according to the data
provided by RAN, by April 2007 that goal still had not been reached. In fact, by the current date
only 10,000 hectares have been privatized. In addition, and as it was indicated above, ejido land
privatization does not necessarily mean the incorporation of all the segregated lands to the urban
land market. In many cases ejidatarios asked for the declaration of dominio pleno in their parcels
for the construction of a transportation node that will help to diminish the traffic chaos generated by Santa Fe, a
private development which problems are solved with public financing. The compensation for the 13,569 square
meters to be expropriated will be 54 million pesos (about 5 million dollars), an amount of money unthinkable a
couple of decades before. However, some experts consulted indicated that the price agreed is well below the real
market value in the area.
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just so they could continue to work in agriculture without depending on the decisions of the ejido
assembly. Other ejidatarios see the change of status to dominio pleno as a way to protect their
parcels against possible invasions by settlers (Maya, 2004).
In one of the few studies on the impact of reforms on land liberalization in the MAMC, Lucy
Maya points out that a significant part of the dominio pleno certificates in the State of Mexico
were given to ejidatarios who had parcels in the zones where demand for urban land was higher,
especially those located in close proximity to main roads. This situation would demonstrate the
willingness from ejidatarios to sell their land for the development of real-estate projects.
However, by June 2001, which is the most recent publicly available data, only 5 ejidos had sold
segregated parcels to real-estate developers. The total sold area was 1,245.1 hectares, well below
what was originally expected to satisfy the land requirements for urban expansion in the MAMC,
especially considering that only 56% of the housing projects developed there were oriented to
low-income families. Moreover, all of the projects built between 1992 and 2002 in the 4
municipalities that concentrate the largest number of affordable houses in MAMC (Tec.mac,
Ixtapaluca, Nicolis Romero, and Tultitlin) were developed either in private or federal land, but
not in privatized land segregated from ejidos, even though they were available in the area (Maya,
2004.) Other parcels have also been sold to private individuals for the construction of single-
family houses, but unfortunately there is no data available about the magnitude of this market.
A Reform with Diluted Effects on Urban Development
According to the data presented above, it is clear that reforms to Article 27 were far from ending
social property in Mexico, because even in the most populated area of the country, where
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pressure for new land is significant, the number of privatizations did not even reach the 5% of the
land certified by CORETT. This situation has a deep impact on urban development, because it is
evident that ejidos and comunidades are not supplying the urban land they were supposed to
provide to satisfy the housing and infrastructure needs of the Mexican cities. Furthermore, there
is enough evidence to demonstrate that, despite all of the governmental efforts and incentives to
eliminate irregular urban practices, uncontrolled and informal urban expansion within ejido
boundaries has continued since 1992.
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Chapter 3
Land Market in the MAMC after the Reforms to Article 27
As it was mentioned in previous chapters, it was expected that massive privatizations of social
property land would take place after the reforms to Article 27 were approved, resulting in a
significant increase in the land available in the real estate market.
A review of the literature published immediately before and after the reforms were passed in
1992 indicates that the following outcomes were expected in the urban sphere:
* An explosive growth of urbanized areas due to an increase of the urban land available in the
periphery of the cities (Warman, 1994).
* A significant increase in the price of ejido land located in areas assigned for urban expansion
in zoning plans due to the possibility of privatization and sale in the formal land market.
* A progressive decrease in the overall price of urban land due to the augment of land available
for the development of real estate projects. The market adaptation would allow the
construction of projects oriented to the lowest-income households, who were the traditional
buyers in the informal market of ejido land.
* The displacement of low-income families to the outskirts of the city due to the increase in the
price of the ejido land located in more centralized areas (Eibenschutz, 1994).
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* Increasing difficulties for the development of public works given the fact the expropriation of
private land is much more expensive and complicated than the social land (Schteingart, 1994;
Va.zquez Castillo, 2004).
* A substantial diminishing in the number of illegal sales of ejido land (Warman, 1994), but a
probable re-emergence of land invasions by low-income families who cannot afford land in
the formal market.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the privatization of ejido land occurred to a much lesser degree than
that which the reforms' promoters expected. Moreover, a large portion of the land segregated
from agrarian communities was not destined for urban development, but for agricultural uses.
Although it is difficult to make an accurate assessment of the effects of the reforms on the urban
land market due to the scarcity of reliable and updated data, it is possible to see some noticeable
outcomes:
* Significant differences among the prices paid for privatized lands sold in the real estate
market.
* There was not a decrease in the overall price of urban land. In fact, the lands that were
available in the formal market did not experience a decrease in their price, but the privatized
lands segregated from ejidos increased their commercial value compared to the price that they
had in the informal market.
* The displacement of the lowest-income households to areas located in the extreme outskirts
of the city.
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The informal ejido land market still remains. Despite the incentives offered by the
government for the privatization and incorporation of ejido land to urban development, it is a
fact that illegal practices still persist in ejidos, which are providing land to all of those
households who cannot afford land in the formal market or who are not satisfied with the
housing that the market offers them.
Land Price Behavior in Privatized Lands
Data regarding the price of privatized lands after the adoption of dominio pleno is scarce.
Nevertheless, the opinions given by the interviewees in this research project are consistent with
those in the limited number of secondary sources available, which contend that the reforms
produced 3 noticeable impacts on the real estate market:
1) Despite the fact that privatized lands located in urban expansion areas experienced a
noticeable increase in their value, ejidatarios have been reluctant to sell them completely to
real estate developers and private individuals. In all of the cases reported ejidatarios reserved
part of the parcels for themselves, either to continue farming on their lands or to establish a
residence for themselves and their families (Maya, 2004). In fact, no ejido has privatized
more than 58% of its area in the MAMC since 1992.26 In this sense, most of the ejidatarios
think that land sale might be an excellent business in the short-term, but one that does not
guarantee their livelihood in the future. Experience shows that many ejidatarios who sold
their parcels soon depleted all the income obtained from the transaction, so the majority
prefers to not risk the economic future of their families by selling them off completely. In a
26 Source: Registro Agrario Nacional, Nticleos Agrarios que Adoptaron el Dominio pleno de Parcelas Ejidales y
Aportaci6n de Tierras de Uso Comfin a Sociedades Mercantiles. Available at http://www.ran.gob.mx
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sense, many ejidatarios have come to consider their ownership of ejido parcels as a sort of
life insurance policy.
This behavior is consistent with the historical patterns the informal sale of ejido land. In most
cases, although significant areas of portions were sold for informal urban development,
ejidatarios were always concerned with keeping part of the ejido for themselves as a
preserved land. In fact, none of the 46 disappeared ejidos of the MAMC (39 in the DF and 7
in the State of Mexico) sold the totality of their land for urban uses. If these ejidos no longer
own land in the MAMC it is because it was either expropriated by the government or
exchanged for lands located in neighboring states.2 7
2) There is a significant difference between the price of land sold to real estate developers and
the land sold to private individuals. The research carried out by Maya (2004) demonstrated
that real estate developers paid much less than private individuals for privatized land located
in urban expansion areas. In the case of the developers, the research shows that location
within the State of Mexico did not have a significant impact on the price of land, whereas in
the case of private individuals the differences are considerable. In the latter case it is possible
to notice that the most expensive lots were sold at a price 18 times that of the most
inexpensive lots (Maya, 2004.) However, the lowest price paid by a private individual buying
privatized ejido land in the MAMC is still higher than the highest price paid by a real estate
developer, which was 160 Mexican pesos per square meter (please refer to row corresponding
to the ejido Santa Marfa Chiconautla, Ecatepec in Table 7).
27 16 ejidos originally placed in the DF exchanged their lands for territory located in other states, though they are still
considered part of the DF from the administrative perspective.
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The reason for this phenomenon is that real estate developers usually buy large portions of
land, which include areas that are not apt for urbanization or that will be used for the street
network and public spaces (usually no more than 70% of the area of a residential
development is assigned to plots for sale). Meanwhile, parcels sold to private individuals
generally do not have to consider areas for urbanization. In addition, it is necessary to take
into account that real estate developers, given their experience and the large scale of the
projects in which they participate, can negotiate more convenient prices with ejidatarios than
private individuals. In this sense, it is worth mentioning that all those ejidatarios who sold
their land in the years immediately after 1992 usually got less money for their parcels than
those who sold them in recent years, who have developed better negotiation skills and have a
more accurate knowledge about how the land market works in the MAMC (Maya, 2004).
Table 7. Privatized Areas Sold to Private Investors 1992 - 2004
Area Sale
Area Incorporated % of total % of Price
Ejido Dominio Urban Dvpt Ejido Dominio (pesos/sq
Ejido Municipality Investor Area (a) Pleno (b) (c) Area (c/a) Pleno (c/b) meters)28
Real
San Bartolomd Coatepec Huixguilucan Estate 471.14 268.02 271.90 57.71% 101.45% 110.00
Real
San Crist6bal Texcalucan Huixquilucan Estate 615.90 435.93 271.20 44.03% 62.21% 110.00
Real
Coacalco Coacalco Estate 707.06 206.63 201.10 28.44% 97.32% 110.00
Real
Santo Tomds Chiconautla Ecatepec Estate 1,744.50 900.04 424.00 24.30% 47.11% 140.00
Real
Santa Maria Chiconautla Ecatepec Estate 463.60 150.45 76.90 16.59% 51.11% 160.00
Private
Cocotitldn CocotitlAn Individual 826.41 376.86 Unknown Unknown Unknown 180.00
Private
Santa Maria Tulpetlac Ecatepec Individual 215.24 127.36 Unknown Unknown Unknown 300.00
Private
San Sim6n Texcoco Individual 136.50 46.13 Unknown Unknown Unknown 300.00
Private
Montecillos Texcoco Individual 115.71 48.81 Unknown Unknown Unknown 480.00
Private
Tultitlan Tultitldn Individual 1,034.84 123.40 Unknown Unknown Unknown 3,300.00
A,• ...... ii ~ ... -___zl__ m ~.... LB--mB. _ rl I'L"•"•'4 I"P'P ... -- I~ , -•m," m_ 1__-- 11 1 .. . . . 't•- - "..--I-- -1- l"•--?-I--. =---J= Im _ | In-- -- m ,-- -. . .. .
28 Mexican pesos of 2001. Reference value: 1US$ = 10.5 pesos
Source: Maya Gonzilez, L scy Nelly. El PF.OCEDE y el PISO en la
pressed 
in hectares.
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In general, it is perceived that the ejidatarios' inexperience with negotiation is one of the
largest obstacles to the incorporation of ejido land for urban development. Ejidatarios are
inherently distrustful, and rarely accept advice from people from outside their social sphere.
This attitude has two consequences: they either negotiate prices that fall under the real land
market value, or do not entertain economic offers because they overestimate the price of their
land.
As it was expressed in a previous chapter, one of the factors that hamper the sale of privatized
ejido land is the general sense that ejidatarios are still victims of unfair negotiations with real
estate developers who seek to take advantage of landowners' ignorance about market, legal,
and administrative issues. Indeed, most of the interviewees in this research project have
expressed this belief and feel that it is based on their many negative experiences with
developers. For instance, plots in Bosque Real Country Club, a residential development
carried out in privatized parcels originally belonging to the ejidos San Crist6bal Texcalucan
and San Bartolom6 Coatepec, were re-sold by the developer at prices ranging from 450-600
dollars per square meter, more than 40 times the price the developer had paid for the land
only a few years before (Maya, 2004).
According to a report developed for the Agrarian Attorney Office, "private investors have
looked for easy money and in the shortest time possible, adopting a pragmatic approach in the
negotiations. In addition, their practices very often de not respect the legislation" (Aguado
and Hernandez y Puente, 2001).
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3) According to the Agrarian Code and in the General Law of Human Settlements, federal
entities and municipalities are supposed to be given preference in the purchase of privatized
land located in areas designated as reserve zones by plans and programs of urban
development. In practice, however, both federal and local governments have declined to use
this prerogative and the only parcels purchased as a result of the adoption of dominio pleno in
the MAMC have been acquired with private capital. There are two explanations for this. The
first is the unwillingness demonstrated by state and local governments to develop affordable
housing projects, which currently are being carried out almost entirely by the private sector.
The State finances and subsidizes projects, but it is not directly involved in their management
and development. The second reason is related to the fact that land expropriation is still a
powerful and convenient tool available for the State to acquire land for urban reserves. The
public sector prefers this procedure because the acquisition of land does not depend on the
willingness to sell from the landowner, and because the value of the compensation is required
to pay, assessed by the Commission of Appraisal of National Properties (CABIN) is usually
lower than the price in the formal land market.
Regarding to what is mentioned above, it is important to indicate that distorted interpretations
of the Expropriations Code have permitted the expropriation of thousands of hectares of ejido
land for the development of private projects, not necessarily related to the public interest that
should justify an expropriation. This practice is still common in many states, and has allowed
the development of private projects like tourism resorts or industrial parks that have taken
advantage of the purchase of land at a lower price than in the market (Vaizquez Castillo,
2004).
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Housing Supply in Mexico City
According to the projections of housing requirements made by different public and private
institutions (World Bank, SEDUVI, Colegio Mexiquense), it is calculated that currently, the real
estate market in the MAMC is providing housing for no more than 30% of the existing demand.
However, the main problem is that those in the remaining 70% are mainly low-income families
who cannot afford the most basic of the housing options offered in the MAMC.
Estimations made by Iracheta for the World Bank (2001) indicate that an average Mexican family
needs 6.3 times the minimum wage29 in order to afford the cheapest house available in the
MAMC. This calculation considers that a weekly income of 4.4 times the minimum wage is
needed for living expenses and an additional one of 1.9 times the minimum wage is needed to
afford the cheapest 30-year mortgage available, allowing a family to purchase a house no larger
than 30 square meters. According to this criterion, 85% of Mexican households encounter serious
difficulty accessing housing, because their weekly income is less than 5 times the minimum
wage. In other words, as many investigations demonstrate (Schteingart, 1990; Azuela and Tomas,
1997; Olvera, 2002), the fact that the urban poor cannot access housing in the formal market is a
chronic problem in Mexico that does not seem to have a solution in the short term.
The analysis of the housing supply in the conurbated municipalities of the State of Mexico, which
is the area in which the city has mainly expanded in the last two decades, shows that only 39,090
houses oriented to the lowest-income sectors were built between 2001 and 2007. They only
represent 12.33% of the total houses supplied in the period (Table 8). The reasons most
29 Minimum wage in the DF and in the State of Mexico is 52.59 Mexican pesos a day, equivalent to 5 dollars.
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frequently given to explain this situation are the high cost of land, which makes it almost
impossible to build affordable houses for the urban poor, and the fact that lowest-income families
cannot take a loan due to the uncertainty of their incomes. The few units built are no larger than
35 square meters, and they are usually placed in small plots that often do not include all the
services typically found in a complete urbanization project. These projects were developed in 9
peripheral municipalities, and are located in places that most of the time lack adequate public
transportation and urban facilities. As Olvera (2002) points out, "big real estate developers are
not interested in the lowest-income population. In terms of supply and demand of urban land, it is
noticeable that, due to the characteristics of the region and the State of Mexico, there is shortage
of land supply to satisfy the requirements of the lowest-income people." 30
It is also noticeable that 72% of the market in the State of Mexico is comprised of so called
"social interest" housing, oriented to households who are not strictly in the lowest-income range
and that are willing to make an effort in order to buy a house in the formal sector. In theory, they
are potential customers of the informal market of ejido land (in fact, many of them live in
irregular settlements,) but prefer the security provided by the possession of a property title given
in the formal market.
Regarding the situation in the DF, the supply of new housing for the lowest-income families is
basically non-existent due to the scarcity and subsequent high price of urban land. The programs
orientated to these sectors developed by the Secretariat of Urban Development and Housing
(SEDUVI) are mainly focused on self-help housing and the upgrading of pre-existing housing
self-constructed by families on urban plots to which they already have the title.
30 Translated from the original Spanish by Rodrigo Diaz.
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Tabla 8. Housing Market in the State of Mexico 2001 2007
Price (Investment Total Houses
Type of Housing Units)31  Built %
Social Progresivo 0- 55,000 39,090 12.33%
Interds Social 55,001 - 71,50q 227,793 71.87%
Popular 71,501 - 104,500 30,500 9.62%
Medio 104,501 - 296,000 9,777 3.08%
Residencial 296,001 - 492,000 7,979 2.52%
Residencial Alto 492,001 and more 710 0.22%
Campestre 492,001 and more 1,116 0.35%
Total 316,961 100.00%
Source: Estado de Mdxico. Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano. Estadisticas. Available at
http://www.edomex.aob.mx/portal/page/portal/sedur
The Displacement of the Most Deprived Sectors
Although it has been demonstrated that the level of ejido land privatization was well below it was
originally expected, ejidatarios have actually learned that the land they own in areas assigned for
urban development is worth much more than it was sixteen years ago. The fact that most of the
ejidatarios have not privatized and sold their land does not necessarily mean that the will not do
it in the future. Land speculation might be considered a new phenomenon in ejidos, and it is a
direct outcome of the reforms of 1992. In spite of the fact that the majority of ejidatarios has
never had an entrepreneurial vocation, it is clear that some of them have acquired a pragmatic
attitude towards their lands and how to administrate them. Hence, they would not have problems
with selling parts of their parcels if they were given an appropriate offer. Meanwhile they still use
them for agricultural exploitation.
31 Investment Units (Unidades de Inversi6n) are adjustable financial units equivalent to 4 pesos (around 40 cents of
dollar) by the time of this research.
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The main victims of this situation are the lowest income families, who not only do not find
affordable housing in the formal sector, but also have seen how the informal market that was their
traditional land supplier, offers them fewer options nowadays. This scenario was expected in
1992, when some scholars (Eibenschutz, 1994; Schteingart, 1994) warned that the reforms would
damage the most deprived groups of the society, for whom housing needs cannot be addressed
either by the market or by public programs, and who can afford land only in the informal sector.
Thus, the only recourse for people in the lowest-income sectors has been to look for a solution in
the informal market either in the extreme periphery of the city, where pressure for urban land is
not so intense and thus, the price is still low, or in ejidos located outside the areas assigned for
urban expansion.
In this sense, it is noticeable that some of the settlers who once invaded or bought land in the
ejido informal market had to move to other ejidos, located in the periphery of the MAMC, after
the places in which they lived experienced an explosive increase in the price of land due to the
interest of private investors to develop real estate projects oriented to higher income households.
Furthermore, sometimes this phenomenon occurs within the informal sphere. As one public
official of the Delegaci6n of Xochimilco pointed out:
"Land price dramatically increases as soon as it is known that an area will be regularized. Then, it
is common that landowners force the settlers to leave the lands they illegally sold, though
sometimes they agree on a payment as a way to compensate the leaving occupants. Once this is
done, ejidatarios quickly sell the land again, this time at a higher price to mid-income
households, who are willing to buy land in the informal market because they are certain that it
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will be regularized in the short term. This situation represents a potentially highly profitable one
for ejidatarios, because in practice they receive money for their land not once but three times:
once, when they illegally sold it to the first low-income settlers, again when they sold the land to
mid-income households, and finally when they are compensated for the expropriation necessary
for regularization."
This is one of the reasons that explain why a big portion of those who participated in land
invasions are reluctant to participate in land tenure regularization programs and the subsequent
distribution of property titles in squatter settlements, a policy that was originally intended to
benefit them. First, they do not want to pay twice for land they believe they had already paid
enough for the first time. In addition, they usually feel that regularization could generate the
gentrification of the areas in which they live, a process that sooner or later might force them to
leave those areas (Vaizquez Castillo, 2004).
The migration of these people in the lowest-income sectors to the outskirts of the city has
accentuated the process of social segregation in Mexico City in the last decades, leading to the
current reality in which peripheral municipalities are the receivers of all those displaced by both
the formal and the informal market in central areas.
The Permanence of the Informal Land Market in the MAMC
According to what is described above, it is evident that a vigorous informal land market oriented
to the lowest-income families still remains in the MAMC. Given the absence of precise and
updated data, it is hard to make an accurate assessment about the relevance of this sector, but it is
reasonable to estimate that much of the 70% of housing demand not currently being supplied by
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the formal market must be provided through informal housing alternatives in the ejidos. For
them, ejido land has a series of advantages that go beyond its low cost:
* The certainty that sooner or later land will be regularized and urbanized. Despite the fact that
the sales are illegal, and no valid property titles are given, tenure security level involved in
the purchase of ejido land for urban uses is relatively high, especially considering that
regularization policies are permanent, and federal and local governments are not willing to
pay the high political cost that massive evictions might have.
* Terms of payment are much more flexible in the informal market than in the formal sector.
This is extremely important for people who typically face income uncertainty in the mid- and
long-term.
* Plots available in the informal market are usually larger than those offered by the formal
sector. In addition, many ejidos can offer better locations than the formal social housing
projects, habitually placed in the extreme outskirts of the city.
* Householders in the informal market do not pay property taxes, and since many times the
services of water, sewerage, and electricity are illegally supplied, their consumption
represents zero cost for the users.
From the government's point of view, it tolerates most of the illegal sales of ejido land (in the
case of invasions it depends on the area). In some sense, the State implicitly recognizes the
important role historically played by the ejidos in providing housing supply for the most deprived
sectors, filling the void left by governmental policies that have not been successful in targeting
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the urban poor (Schteingart, 1990.) In addition, it is publicly known that many public officials are
involved in the promotion and organization of irregular developments in ejido land, which are
still a highly profitable business for all those who participate on it.
On the ejido side, irregular land sale for urban purposes is still attractive, especially when the
lands are not adequate for agriculture or when they are located outside the zones assigned for
urban expansion. In addition, the informal market offers them the possibility of getting money
much quicker than in the formal sector, where procedures are extremely time-consuming for
people who usually decide to sell their lands when they are in a financial emergency. Finally, the
illegal sale allows ejidatarios to keep the tenure of their lands, and in case of expropriation they
know they will be compensated. In this sense, one of the outcomes of the process of land
certification implemented by PROCEDE is the appearance of a new type of illegality that
consists in the sale of certified parcels not covered by dominio pleno as if they were private
property, thus receiving the same price as in the formal market (Olivera, 2001).
It is a fact that informality persists in the Mexico City land market because there is a political,
economic and social system that is willing to accept it. Although the sale of not privatized ejido
land for urban purposes is still considered an offense penalized by law, in practice no ejidatario
has been castigated for doing it. In such a context, it is to be expected that the illegal sale of land
is still commonplace in Mexican cities.
What is puzzling is the fact that these practices persist in spite of the supposed incentives oriented
to transfer land from collective ownership to private ownership and consequently obtain the
benefits of a possible sale in the real estate market at what one would expect to be much higher
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prices than in the informal sector. As it was expressed in the intro of this research, the causes that
explain this phenomenon are multiple and complex, and go beyond the economic and
institutional spheres. The next chapters address the political, social and cultural facts that have
helped to maintain a system that, contrary to what was predicted sixteen years ago, refuses to
disappear.
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Chapter 4
Case Studies
Ejido San Gregorio Atlapulco
This ejido is located in the Delegaci6n of Xochimilco in the south of Mexico City. Peasants from
San Gregorio are descendents of the xochimilca tribe, who inhabited the area before the arrival of
the Spanish conquistadores in Mexico. In San Gregorio, they developed a distinctive agricultural
technique called chinamperia, based on the cultivation of crops in artificial islands formed with
mud and which are connected by a network of narrow water canals. Chinampas have been the
source of livelihood for the families who have lived in the area for more than five centuries, and
their unique composition influenced UNESCO to declare Xochimilco a World Heritage site in
1987.
The contemporary ejido was created in 1924 from the restitution of 476 hectares that were
fraudulently appropriated in the 19th century by Enrique Urrutia, a doctor who was well-
connected to political authorities and became one the most important hacendados (large estate
owners) of Mexico City. This feudalistic background explains why people from San Gregorio
were strongly committed to the Revolution, where many of them had important positions in
Zapata's troops.
Once it was restituted, the ejido was internally subdivided in individual parcels of approximately
5,000 square meters each, but never counted with communal use lands or areas assigned for
human settlement. Its 830 members were peasants until thirty years ago, when urban sprawl had
yet enveloped Xochimilco. Currently most residents are either retired or work in activities
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unrelated to agriculture. For this reason, today the ejido looks mostly abandoned, with no more
than 50 parcels used for agriculture and greenhouses having replaced the traditional corn
cultivation.
From the urban perspective, what makes the ejido interesting is that in spite of the significant
pressure for urban expansion in the area, the residents have not sold their land, unlike those in the
five other ejidos of Xochimilco.32 Only a small settlement was developed there in the nineteen
seventies, which was regularized in 1981 by CORETT. Since then, irregular expansion is
practically absent in the ejido, with the exemption of only seven houses that are informal,
according to the Urban Development Department of the Delegaci6n of Xochimilco.
Members of this community are well known to be combative; in fact, they are usually called
chicuarotes, a nahuatl word that refers to a tough person (Anagua, 2006). Disputes are common
in the community, and violence is an element that has been present throughout a long portion of
San Gregorio's history. The most relevant internal conflict took place in 1989, when the
government expropriated 257 hectares that were flooded after the construction of an artificial
lagoon in the area. A group of ejidatarios, grouped in the Frente Emiliano Zapata, organized
protests, the first of its type in the DF, to oppose the decision, but their fight was futile. The
division in the community still persists, because an important group of ejidatarios think that the
expropriation was fraudulently executed, having benefited only the former members of the
comisaria ejidal who dealt with the government. In fact, after almost twenty years,
compensations have not been completely paid, a situation that has increased the level of conflict
within the community.
32 In fact, 4 of the original 6 ejidos did disappear (San Lucas Xochimanca, Santa Cruz Xochitepec, Tepepan, and
Xochimilco). They still legally exist, but do not count with lands.
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Ejido San Nicolis Totolapan
This community is located in the Delegaci6n of La Magdalena Contreras, in the south of Mexico
City, and its origins can be found in 1535, when the Spanish conquistadores delimitated an area
for communal exploitation of land in the zone of Ajusco. The contemporary ejido was created in
1924, when the government assigned 1,300 hectares to a group of 336 ejidatarios. In 1938
1,375.6 hectares were added, which made the ejido the largest of the DF.
The ejido was divided in three areas: communal land that corresponds to about 1,700 hectares of
hills and woods which are mostly unsuitable for housing and agricultural development; individual
parcels, located in the plain lowlands; and a human settlement area in the historical center of the
village. Throughout the years San Nicolis Totolapan became the symbol of the illegal expansion
of the city. Both invasions and informal sales effaced most of the parcels assigned for cultivation.
The once small village inhabited by a community of peasants became an urbanized area with a
population estimated at more than 20,000 people.
In the 1990s the ejido received offers from private investors to establish a joint-venture for the
development of an amusement and theme park.33 Despite the economic-attractiveness of these
offers, the ejido rejected them. Instead, with the advice of an NGO they developed 'Parque
Ejidal San Nicolds Totolapan', a 1,700 hectares private park administrated by the community for
which the revenues are shared between all of the community members. In addition, the park
generates more than 70 permanent jobs, mostly taken by ejidatarios and their relatives. The
successful experience of San Nicolds Totolapan has been replicated in other ejidos located in
rural areas in different Mexican states, which have developed economically and environmentally
sustainable projects to impede the urban expansion within them.
S33 Actually an automobile museum
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Since urban expansion enveloped San Nicolas many years ago, almost none of its members work
in agricultural activities. It is also noticeable that both income and education level in San Nicolas
are higher than in San Gregorio. Compared to their equals of Xochimilco, ejidatarios of San
Nicolas are more entrepreneurial, less politicized, and less combative, and they historically have
had a more pragmatic approach towards land administration. This pragmatism transformed them
into experts of informality, who have developed many techniques and mechanisms for informal
land sales, which historically has been supported by a network of public officials and authorities.
Ejido San Gregorio Atlapulco San Nicolas Totolapan
Number of ejidatarios 830 334 (336 originally)
Year of Creation 1924 1924
Original Area (hectares) 476.37 2,675.6 (1,300 + 1,375.6)
Current Area (hectares) 206.39 2,212. 14
Number of Expropriations 2 3
Area Expropriated (hectaresl) 269.98 414.14
Area Expropriated to Regularize 12.40 407.00
Irregular Settlements (hectares)
Internal Subdivisions Parcels in process of delimitation Communal use area
and certification Parcels
Human settlement area
Economic Activities Agriculture (greenhouses) Agriculture
Private park
Leisure (restaurants, paintball
fields, football fields)
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Chapter 5
The Hindering Effect of Participation
iEsto se Ileva tiempo sejlores, no son enchiladas!3 4
Mario, ejido leader
Reforms to Article 27 are based on the idea that more than 70 years after the Revolution the
agrarian communities had enough capacity to decide the best way to administrate their lands by
themselves. Ejidos were born with extremely limited autonomy due to all the mechanisms of
state intervention in agrarian affairs, and by the legal figure of the usufruct of land that belongs to
the entire nation that did not allow the members of the agrarian communities to benefit from the
full ownership of the territories in which they worked and lived.
In this context, ejidatarios' opinions were seldom heard by the government, with the exception of
the Comisario, who usually had a close relationship with the political authorities. Indeed, more
than representatives of the ejidatarios' opinion, comisarios were often considered as de facto
delegates of the government within the communities. As Assenatto and de Le6n (1996) point out,
"the General Assembly of ejidatarios was theoretically the basis nucleus of ejido democracy,
because all of the decisions related to the internal life of the ejidos had to be discussed on it.
34 This takes time, gentlemen; it's not like preparing enchiladas!
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Nevertheless, in practice it was frequent that the assembly did not work properly, so the
Comisario used to take both the domestic and the important decisions." 35
However, reforms in 1992 changed the scenario, providing the community with the right to
choose not only how to administrate the ejidos, but also the possibility of dismantling them as
social structures through the segregation of privatized parcels. In this sense, the most important
effects of the reforms were on the one hand the enhancement of the General Assembly (Asamblea
Ejidal) as the supreme instance of decision-making in the ejido scope, and on the other hand the
diminishing influence of the state in the internal life of the communities (Olivera, 2005).
In this context, crucial decisions regarding land tenure, which were unilaterally taken by the State
until 1992, were completely transferred to the communities. As was pointed out in a previous
chapter, in the case of the process of land delimitation and subsequent certification implemented
by PROCEDE, the reforms required the consent of two-thirds of the assembly in each of the three
steps of the process:
1) Decision to participate in PROCEDE.
2) Approval of the areas assigned to parcels, communal use and human settlement.
3) Approval of the measurement and delimitation of internal areas carried out by PROCEDE.
In the case of privatization through the adoption of dominio pleno, and despite its effects on
individual parcels, the decision also has to be taken in another assembly with the consent of two-
thirds of the members.
35 Translated from the original Spanish by Rodrigo Diaz.
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Thus, what seems to be an adequate procedure designed to promote the development of
democracy at the community level through the involvement of the whole ejido in the issues that
directly affect it, has in fact produced a series of outcomes that hinder the declared governmental
purpose of providing more autonomy to agrarian communities to administrate the lands they own.
Democracy at the Community Level: The Case of San Gregorio Atlapulco
This research involved attendance at two asambleas ejidales in San Gregorio Atlapulco that were
held in July 2007 and January 2008, and which were the only general meetings that this ejido
held during the period of research. This community usually meets twice a year, which is the
minimum established by the Agrarian Code.36 As some public officials expressed, this is the
typical regularity in most of the ejidos, although they are free to schedule more meetings if they
deem it necessary.37
The Assembly has to be called by the members of the Comisaria at least 8 days in advance, but it
can also be scheduled if a group of 20 ejidatarios or the 20% of the community members
requests it. Only the registered members can participate on it, but they can designate a
representative. The meetings are also attended by special guests, who are usually officials from
different public institutions. They need a special invitation from the Comisario, which specifies
whether or not the guest has the right to speak.
In order to be valid, the Assembly requires the attendance of half plus one of the members of the
community. If this quorum is not reached, the meeting is rescheduled for a date between 8 and 30
36 Agrarian Code, Article 23
37 Agrarian Code, Article 24
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days after the first was called. In this case, the meeting is considered legitimate no matters how
many people attend it. That is what usually happens. As the Comisario told me, he does not
remember the last time that there was quorum in San Gregorio to hold an Assembly at the first
call. However, the discussion of important topics related to land tenure and internal organization,
like the participation in PROCEDE, the delimitation and certification of parcels, communal areas,
and human settlement areas, the endowment of land to mercantile societies, and the adoption of
dominio pleno in certificated parcels does require the presence of half plus one of the ejidatarios,
excluding the possibility of having a meeting with fewer attendees.38
Democracy without participation
In the case of the two meetings that I attended in San Gregorio, no more than 150 people
participated in them, a number that represents less than 20% of the ejido members. The public
officials that were invited told me that this is the usual percentage in the rest of the ejidos of the
DF. This situation raises the question of where the other ejidatarios are.
The reasons usually advanced to explain the absence of many of the members of the community
in the assembly is their advanced age, the fact that many of them do not live in the area, and the
fact that they do not work in activities based on the ejido. However, the main reason would be the
extended belief that assemblies are useless because all the important decisions are taken by the
leaders who control the votes of the rest of the community. As one ejidatario told me:
"I prefer to stay home on a Saturday morning. Going to an assembly is a waste of time since the
debate is always monopolized by the same people. The rest of us have the opportunity to
38 Agrarian Code, Article 26
City Growth and Community-Owned Land in Mexico City I The Hindering Effect of Participation
participate and express our opinions, but at the end of the day the leaders decide everything in
private."
It is also common to hear opinions that express total mistrust towards the real power of the
assembly vis-a-vis the government. The ejidatarios who think this way are usually the oldest
people, who grew up in a context in which the state explicitly did intervene in every aspect of the
ejido life. However, this also can be interpreted as a clear manifestation of the common ignorance
about the rights of the ejidatarios after the reforms of 1992. Interviews and the discussion in the
assemblies demonstrated that even the leaders and the educated members of the community
usually ignore the most basic aspects of the legal and institutional frameworks that have regulated
ejidos since 1992, or wrongly interpret them according to their particular points of view
(Bouquet, 1996). For instance, leaders in ejido San Gregorio still think that they only have the
right to usufruct the land whose property belongs to the entire nation, a concept that was
abolished by the reforms passed by the government of Salinas de Gortari.3
Important issues like land subdivision and privatization require a quorum which is difficult to
reach given the circumstances described above so it is common practice to bring uninterested
people to the meetings. In those cases, leaders offer not only transportation, but also money and
favors to ejidatarios in order to assure the quorum either to approve or to reject a motion. Threats
are also common, and there is enough evidence to affirm that many privatizations were
sanctioned by ejidatarios who were menaced or bribed by internal and external interest groups.
39 It is also common for ejidos to be advised by 'experts' on legal issues who give them incomplete or definitely
distorted interpretations of the law and how to take advantage of these interpretations. As one interviewee who works
in a public institution pointed out, "they are usually former public officials who present themselves as experts but are
only interested in getting some money from the communities."
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There is also evidence that some privatizations were approved in nonexistent meetings,
supervised by corrupt officials and comisarios.
Some authors (Warman, 1994; Olivera, 2005) point out that the reforms enhanced the power of
the community as a whole in the decision-making process in the ejidos. However, the evidence
provided by the ejido San Gregorio is consistent with what is pointed out in other studies (Austin,
1994; Jones and Ward, 1998; Jones and Pisa, 2000) in the sense that the people who really make
the decisions in the agrarian communities are the members of the Comisaria and the leaders of
the different groups that exist within the ejido. As the Austin Memorandum indicates, "in large
part it will be the Comisariado Ejidal which will decide the outcome of the Reform on the
ground" (Austin, 1994). Since the government lost many of the faculties of intervention in ejido
affairs, and the ejido authorities cannot be removed by the political authority from their charges,
as was the case before 1992, they have more freedom to exercise their influence over the rest of
the community. As an old ejidatario expressed:
"Comisarios were in practice employees of the government in the past. They actually had to do
what the political authorities ordered if they wanted to preserve their positions. Nowadays the
members of the Comisarfa are more powerful, and in many cases are real dictators who do not
accept criticism from the rest of the community."
The Participants
The first thing that calls the attention in an ejido assembly is the advanced age of the participants.
In the case of San Gregorio it is noticeable that at least half of the audience is over 70 years old.
Many of them are unable to hear, and as one ejidatario says, "probably they have no idea of what
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the discussion is about. When it is time to vote they just repeat what the majority does". In fact, I
could see how some of them raised their hands to vote after the ejidatario who was beside them
told them to do so.40
One of the outcomes of the succession system in ejidos established by the Agrarian Code is the
advanced age of most of its members. In this sense, most of the time ejidatarios acquire
membership after the death of the previous ejido rights holder, what usually happens when the
new ejidatario is middle-aged or even older, and thusly has worked for a long time in activities
not related to the ejido. The numbers speak for themselves: at the national level more than half of
the ejidatarios are older than 50 years of age, and 25 percent of the total is older than 65 years of
age. In the case of the D.F., the average age of ejidatarios is 59.5 years old (the highest national
figure), whilst in the State of Mexico it is 52.2 years of age. Regarding to source of income, only
1% of the ejidatarios of the D.F. declared that agriculture was their main source of income (the
lowest national figure), while in the State of Mexico the number increases to 39.4% (Ibarra,
Castells et al., 1999).
In addition, a large portion of the audience is not educated, and levels of illiteracy are higher in
ejidos than in the rest of the country. Thus, 7.6% of the ejidatarios are illiterate in the D.F., and
in the case of the State of Mexico the number is even higher, reaching the 16.8% (Ibarra, Castells
et al., 1999).
40 Indeed, sometimes it is possible to see the grotesque scene of people lifting the hands of these elderly ejidatarios
while the lost looks in their faces evidences the complete ignorance about the subject in debate.
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The Ejido Way of Participation
As one of the interviewees said, "attending an ejido assembly is a real test of your patience. In
this sense, these 'marathons of participation' end when the participants are simply exhausted."
Confirming this opinion, the shortest of the meetings held in San Gregorio took four and a half
hours, and the other five. However, it is common that assemblies extend for longer.
The reunion is structured according to an outline read by the Secretary at the beginning and the
moderator is usually the Comisario or one of the members of the board of authorities, although
the rest of the assembly can designate another person to do this. In the case of San Gregorio each
attendee has the right to speak for no more than 3 minutes in each of his/her interventions, but
this rule is not applied to the guest speakers, who have all the time they feel is necessary for their
speeches.
The presentations are about different topics, which range from a proposal for a new delimitation
of parcels to the report of the ejido internal finances. The presentations are in general extremely
vague and no supporting documents are provided to the audience. It is common that the speakers
utilize a wordy style of speech that provides scarce information about the topics to discuss.41 It is
also usual that presentations made by public officials about issues like delimitation of parcels or
compensation for expropriations be continuously interrupted by attendees that express they do
not understand the technical concepts expressed. In fact, it is clear that some of the speakers lack
the ability to communicate the ideas in appropriate language, although this attitude is probably
41 While attending these meetings I rememberd that was in Mexico where the term "cantinfleo" was coined. The
expression, a tribute to the famous comedian Mario Moreno, "Cantinflas", refers to the ability to speak for long
without saying anything substantial.
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deliberate since sometimes they do not really want the community really understand the message.
As might be expected in this context, the discussion of and voting on the different topics up for
debate do not fulfill the minimum requirements of transparency: information is incomplete, many
times it is not clear what it is being voted on, and the count of the votes is extremely informal and
inaccurate (nobody checks if somebody voted twice, and the assembly has to trust the ability of
the member of the board of authorities who is in charge of this task to count hands, something
very difficult to do when the assemblies are crowded).
The tone of the discussion is generally passionate and often aggressive. Interruptions are
abundant and few participants are able to expose all of their arguments. Shouts are common, and
a brawl even took place in the first meeting. Public officials who are invited to participate in the
assembly tell me that the chaotic atmosphere is basically the same in all of the ejidos of the
MAMC, and episodes of violence between members of the community are more common than
one might expect.42
Participation, Conflicts, and the Increase in the Transaction Costs
There is consensus among scholars, public officials, and ejidatarios that conflicts in the ejido
significantly increased in the nineties, when the reforms were approved and Mexico began the
process of democratization which meant the end of 71 years of the de facto political system of
single party rule. In a case study carried out in the ejido Tecoripa, Sonora, Buirquez and Yetman
(1998) describe how a community experienced a process of quick degradation when its members
42 One of the public officials told me about the case of one ejido in the Ajusco area where meetings are usually
attended by 500 or more people. There, ejidatarios used to leave their guns in a sort of cloakroom located at the
entrance of the place in which the assembly is held.
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started to discuss the terms of the delimitation and certification processes implemented by
PROCEDE. In that case, the conflict was produced between the leaders, who held the largest and
best located parcels, and the rest of the community, who sought an increase in the size of their
parcels and its subsequent privatization through the adoption of dominio pleno. This research
provided three conclusions that are common to many of the ejidos that faced the decision of
whether to privatize the land or not:
1) The leaders are generally resistant to the idea of privatizing the land. Although they usually
possess the largest and best located parcels, and therefore the most attractive land in the
formal market, they prefer to preserve the regime of social property. This situation allows
them to retain the leadership in their ejidos, something much more difficult when the parcels
are private and the decisions are not tied to the approval of the rest of the community. It also
permits them to keep their privileged position in the informal market, where they are usually
the main promoters of illegal sales (in fact, many times they charge other ejidatarios with a
fee for the consent of the irregular sale of their lands).
2) Increasing levels of participation led to the appearance of controversies about land property
that had been customary accepted by the moment in which the discussion started. In this
sense, it is clear that most of the communities simply were not prepared for the process of
internal democracy proposed by the reforms of Article 27. The lack of skills of negotiation
and the inexistence of internal mechanisms of dispute solution translated in the incapacity to
reach agreements between the different members of the community.
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3) Prolonged discussions about whether or not privatize the land significantly increase the costs
of transaction. Since a privatization process takes at least two years to materialized, it does
not look attractive either for the ejidatarios interested to commercialize their parcels or for
the potential investors. In such a context it is predictable that both parties prefer to negotiate
in the informal arena, where the transactions are faster, less complicated, and lower cost.
According to these observations, it would be reasonable to assume that the ejidos that privatized
their land were those comprised of fewer members in which it would be easier to agree on the
terms of the internal delimitation and privatization. However, an analysis of the MAMC shows
that the average number of members of the ejidos that privatized part of their parcels (162) is
actually higher than in the communities that decided to keep the social property in the entire ejido
(159). 43
Since there are no significant differences in the area of the ejidos, the explanation has to be found
in how these ejidos are organized. In this sense, all of the interviewees coincided on the idea that
in practice privatization is impossible without the support of the leaders. When they are willing to
carry out this process, things are done easily, because they have the power to manage the
Assembly. However, and as is indicated above, most of the time the leaders are reluctant to
segregate lands from their ejidos because it might translate into the disappearance of their
constituencies and in the subsequent loss of their leadership among the communities. In all of the
ejidos that privatized part of their lands the comisarios played a fundamental role, convincing the
43 Source: Padr6n e Historial de Nticleos Agrarios (PHINA), available at http://www.ran.gob.mx. This analysis does
not take into account the DF, where PROCEDE was not implemented.
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rest of the community of the benefits of this decision, and also monitoring and controlling the
possible conflicts that could appear in the discussion.
When Participation Leads to Informality
The ideologues of the reforms imposed a model based on participatory process on communities
that had scarce or null experience in participation. This radical change produced outcomes that
were far from the original purposes of the reform and that hamper the objective of liberalization
of land markets and incorporation of social land into the urban development in the main Mexican
cities:
* The level of participation is pretty low, so decisions that affect the entire community are
taken by a small group of people. Related to this, in practice the reforms transferred the
tutelage of the ejido from the State to the comisarios, who can usually manage the assemblies
to approve or reject issues related to land tenure in the ejidos. Since the assemblies typically
meet only twice a year, and the systems of accountability are extremely precarious, the
leaders can easily monopolize the internal agenda of the communities.
* The appearance of a clear division within the communities between ejidatarios and people
who do not have an ejido membership and therefore do not have the right to participate in the
decision-making processes. This is especially clear in the case of young people and settlers
who have lived for many years in the land sold by the ejidatarios but cannot participate in the
discussion of the issues that affect the communities. As Coyote (2004) points out, "it is
extremely difficult for young people directly participate in the decision making processes in
their communities if they do not possess any kind of land title, like being ejidatario,
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comunero, or even posesionario."" In this sense, it is not surprising that many of the conflicts
within the communities are led by young people, who think there is no room for them in the
important decisions that have an effect on the ejido.
The overall outcome is the fact that the involvement of the whole community in the land
privatization process has made it extremely complex, demanding, and time-consuming. In
this context, the formal procedures do not look attractive for the ejidatarios who are willing
to sell their lands, and for those who are potentially interested in buying those lands. For
them, informality still has many advantages (negotiations are face to face, quick, simple, and
do not require the approval of others than those directly involved in the transaction).
These findings support the idea that the outcomes of the reforms were different than originally
expected because the communities were simply not prepared for such a significant change in the
way they had traditionally organized as a social group and administered their properties. In other
words, it has been demonstrated that ejidos were not able to fulfill the minimum prerequisites
needed for the implementation of the participatory processes that were the base of the model
proposed in 1992. The lack of adequate channels of participation, the low level of education of
the ejidatarios, and the deficient mechanisms for accountability and internal control are some of
the factors that made the promotion of the democracy at the community level a utopia in the case
of the ejidos.
The experience of the last sixteen years in Mexico challenge the widespread belief that land
privatization is necessarily related to increasing levels of democracy. In fact, the evidence shows
that those ejidos that decided to privatize part of their lands were usually led by authoritarian
44 Translated from the original Spanish by Rodrigo Diaz.
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caciques who had the capacity to impose their ideas in their communities. As Jones and Pisa
(2000) pointed out in the case of the joint-venture carried out in the ejido San Antonio, Torre6n,
"the decision of which land was to be donated to the partnership appears to have been taken by
the ejido president and a small group of supporters with little evidence of wider consultation."
Private investors also preferred to negotiate with these leaders, because dealing with them is
easier than with a whole community, and because they have the ability to control the possible
disputes that might emerge in the internal discussion of the privatization process. On the other
hand, those ejidos that do not count on powerful leaders have experienced the multiplication of
internal conflicts, and few of them have been able to reach agreements for land privatization.
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Chapter 6
Clientelism and the Persistence of the Informal Land Market
The simple endowment of land is not enough to
solve the agrarian problem. The State is obligated
to bring ejidatarios all the moral and material
support to make them prosper economically, and
to free their spirit from ignorance and prejudices.
President Ldizaro CUirdenas, 1934
Ejidos historically provided the government the perfect environment for the political intervention
in the agrarian scope. The fact that one quarter of the Mexican population lives in agrarian
communities makes them an attractive constituency for the political authorities, which since the
first years after the Revolution displayed an enormous apparatus of public institutions in order to
assure the political control of the ejidos. As Jones and Ward (1998) point out, "the distribution of
land to ejidos established the communities as strategic components of Mexico's enduring
corporate political system and offered the ruling party, Partido Revolucionario Institucional
(PRI) the chance to present itself as the Guardian of the Revolution."
The network of institutions was also supported by the legal framework provided by the Article 27
and the ambiguous concept of the usufruct of lands that belong to the entire nation, which kept
the ejidatarios in a state of permanent tenure insecurity that was seized by the government in
order to perpetuate the agrarian communities' dependency of the State (Cymet, 1992). In this
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sense, "the institutionalization of this ambiguity provided the government with a public claim
over land and created a captive constituency for political support" (Jones and Ward, 1998).
However, patronage was not only restricted to the ejido realm. Taking advantage of the legal
ambiguity on land tenure, the government traditionally allowed the development of the informal
land market within the agrarian communities as a way to provide housing solutions to the most
deprived sectors of the society, those unserved by the public programs. In fact, there is enough
evidence that demonstrates that many illegal invasions were promoted and organized by
politicians in order to extend the political control over the population of squatter settlements.
Thus, the State adopted an ambivalent attitude towards ejidos: on the one hand it offered them
political protection and a preferential treatment in the form of subsidies, grants, and allowances to
develop irregular land transactions, and on the other hand it took advantage of the ambiguous
situation of property, treating social land as de facto public land that could be easily used for all
kinds of purposes (not all of them of in the public interest), including the provision of land for all
those who could not find housing in the formal sector. As the Austin Memorandum (1994)
indicates, "the ejido and its illegal development offer important opportunities for political
mileage at relatively low cost and with high impact, albeit with rather superficial gains to
individual beneficiaries."
Although political intervention through the ejidos can be found in the origins of the agrarian
reform, it was consolidated almost twenty years later during the presidency of Lazaro Cirdenas
(1934 - 1940), who grouped all of the beneficiaries receiving land from the State in the National
Peasant Confederation (CNC), which provided a political base for the land redistribution
program. Throughout the years, the couple of PRI social branches, the CNC and the
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Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), took complete control of all of the social
organizations in Mexico. In the case of the CNC, its structure was based on a network of ejido
leaders, all of them members of the ruling party, who, more than representatives of their ejidos
and comunidades, were de facto governmental delegates.
The Democratization of Clientelism
The reforms of 1992 were passed in a context characterized by the political democratization of
Mexico that would lead to the end of the single party system in 2000 with the election of the
right-wing National Action Party's (PAN) presidential candidate, Vicente Fox.
However, in the case of the MAMC the winds of change appeared in 1997, with the first
democratic election of the DF's governor, Cuauht6moc Cirdenas, son of former president Laizaro
Cdrdenas, and representative of the left-wing Democratic Revolution Party (PRD). Cirdenas also
designated the mayors (delegados) of the 16 delegaciones in which the DF is administratively
divided. Cirdenas' election changed the scenario of Mexican politics, and ejidos were one of the
first areas that experienced the changes. As a way to counterbalance the power of the federal
Secretariat of the Agrarian Reform (SRA), controlled by PRI, the new governor created the
Office of Agrarian Issues of the DF. The mission of this office is basically the same as the SRA,
but in practice, was the instrument used by the PRD to penetrate the communities historically
controlled by the PRI. In this sense, the methods utilized by the PRD were the same than the ones
used by PRI for decades: a package of subsidies and benefits for agrarian communities tied to the
election of comisarios whose ideologies were related to that of the party. In fact, it is common
that many comisarios and leaders who were PRI members in the seventies and eighties
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transitioned to the PRD in the nineties as a way to keep the benefits they had acquired during the
single party regime. As one ejido leader confessed: "comisarios have no ideology: they like to be
in the sunny side of the street. If the sun is on the left, they move to the left, but they do not have
problems to switch to the right if they think it is necessary."
This situation was accentuated after 2000, when all the governors and mayors began to be
democratically elected. It meant competition for the agrarian vote between the three major parties
(PAN, PRI, and PRD), and the subsequent increased politicization of the ejido realm. There were
two direct outcomes of this situation:
The proliferation of public institutions in charge of ejido issues. The competition between
the three main parties ensured that, in many places, the three levels of government (federal,
state, and municipal) were headed by different parties. Thus, it became common that all of
these levels had their own departments in charge of agrarian issues that, more than attending
community needs, competed for the political control of their constituencies. Since usually
there is no coordination between these instances, overlaps in functions are common,
contributing to generate an extremely confusing institutional framework that does not help at
all the development of the agrarian communities. As it was mentioned above, more than
technical guidance, many times these institutions provide benefits of dubious utility whose
only purpose is attracting the ejido vote and avoiding possible conflicts and protests. Good
examples of this are all of the subsidies for agricultural development distributed to most of
the ejidatarios in the DF, a place where only 1% of the ejido population obtains its livelihood
from agricultural labor (Ibarra, Castells, et al., 1999).
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The emergence of new leaders and groups within the ejidos. The democratization process
created fertile ground for the proliferation of new groups within the communities, who started
to compete for the political and economic favors offered by the authorities. These groups
replaced the monopolistic leaderships of the past, and are not necessarily related to specific
parties. Most of the time, groups are structured around a leader (cacique), who is the most
prominent member of the families comprising the community (family ties are common
among ejidatarios). Caciques usually have a higher level of education than the rest of the
community (the comisario of San Nicolds is a dentist, while his colleague of San Gregorio is
a primary school teacher), and typically they own the larger and better-located parcels of the
ejido. The privileged status they enjoy in their communities allows them to have direct access
to the authorities and to all of the political, social, and even economic benefits that might be
derived from this relationship. In such a context, ideology does not play an important role,
and leaders and their constituencies easily switch from one political patronage to other.
The Political Dimension of Ejidos
The mapping of all of the public institutions that deal with ejido affairs is a difficult task due to
the overlaps and lack of clarity about the specific role of each of the institutions. In the case of
San Gregorio Atlapulco and San Nicolas Totolapan it is possible to identify at least 12
intervening public institutions divided into the three levels of government.45 Even the public
45 The federal institutions that have relationships with the ejido are Secretariat of the Agrarian Reform (SRA), the
Secretariat of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries (SEMARNAP), the Secretariat of Social Development
(SEDESOL), the Commission for Land Tenure Regularization (CORETT), the Office of the Agrarian Attorney (PA),
and the Trust National Fund for Ejido Promotion (FIFONAFE). The institutions that depend on the government of
the DF are the Secretariat of Agrarian Issues of the Federal District, the Commission of Natural Resources
(CORENA), and the Secretariat of Urban Development and Housing (SEDUVI). In the case of the local level, the
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officials interviewed were not able to explain the differences between these institutions and how
they differ or work together. What is clear is that more than complementary, they are competitors
to gain the preferences of the same constituency. The means utilized are basically the same
described above: subsidies, grants, and even jobs in the public administration. Many interviewees
pointed out that it is common that social conflicts are solved with positions in a Delegacian. It is
also common to hear that the leaders are usually paid by political authorities in order to control
potential conflicts within the communities. Although none of the interviewees provided any
concrete proof about these practices, the rumor is widespread at the ejido level, and many of the
public officials interviewed expressed the same idea. Anyway, it is a fact that ejido leaders still
have a close relationship with political authorities, and it is evident that they enjoy a preferential
treatment from the government, which is translated into political and often economic benefits for
both parties. 46
At the community level, both case studies have also experienced the emergence of antagonistic
groups within the community in the last 20 years. In the case of San Gregorio, until the late
eighties it was dominated by one cacique, don Fausto, who was also the right hand of Antonio
Rozas, a legendary and powerful cacique who politically controlled the area of Xochimilco for
decades. The advance of the process of national democratization saw don Fausto's monopolistic
authority by one group, Frente Emiliano Zapata (not related to the zapatista movement in
Chiapas). The Frente did not agree with the terms negotiated between Rufino and the government
departments of Urban Development, Land Tenure, and Citizen Participation of the Delegaciones of Xochimilco and
Magdalena Contreras are in charge of ejidal issues.
46 Some comisarios like to boast of the numbers that they have in their cell phones, which include many influential
political authorities. It is also noticeable that they have a special treatment when they want to speak with a political
authority. They are usually received by the Delegado, while the rest of the people have to resign to speak with
assistants or second-tier authorities.
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regarding the expropriation of 257 hectares of flooded ejido land (the land had been flooded after
the construction of the hydrological regulation lagoon of La Estrella in 1989). It was the
beginning of a long saga of internal disputes that led to the appearance of three groups structured
around three different leaders within the ejido. All of these leaders were members of the PRI in
the past, but two of them are currently identified with the PRD, although in different factions.
However, none of them admits his partisanship, preferring to say that they are apolitical and that
their work is inspired only by the aim to serve their community. This ambiguity allows them to
easily switch according to the circumstances.
The case of San Nicolas is similar, though the two factions in which the ejido is divided are
headed by leaders from different parties (PRI and PRD). However, and as the interviewees
pointed out, their ideological commitment is weak, and depending on the historical circumstances
they have switched from one party to the other. In this sense, the words of a former comisario of
San Nicolds are enlightening:
"Who controls the ejido has a lot of power, and it is not necessary to look for the politicians: they
come to you...anyway, we are not tied to any political party, because we are independent.
However, if the parties want to help us we are not so stupid to reject that help. Throughout the
years we have learned how to deal with politicians of different parties and how to obtain benefits
from that relationship."
In the case of San Nicolas, benefits mean an annual grant from the Commission of Natural
Resources (CORENA) for each ejidatario just for possessing lands in conservation areas,
subsidies and contributions for the private park developed in the communal lands of the ejido,
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and more important, the tacit allowance to illegally sell land piecemeal for residential uses or to
occupy it in uses that are not permitted by the zoning plans. In this sense, the illegal urbanization
of most of the areas assigned for individual parcels in that ejido would not have been possible
without any kind of political support.
The Lack of Political Support for Land Privatization
It is clear that low-income settlers are as attractive constituents as the ejidos. Politicians
understood a long time ago that both votes count the same, so it was necessary to develop a
strategy that could satisfy each group without losing political support from the other. The answer
was given by the informal land market, which provides what both groups are looking for:
affordable land in the case of the landless people, and the opportunity of quick and easy money
from land sales in the case of ejidatarios. As Siembieda (1996) expressed, "by linking
government actions -titles- to the national party, the voting potential of these densely populated
settlements is brought into the political arena."
In this context, and from a political perspective, a land privatization process does not look
attractive for any of the stakeholders in the agrarian realm. On the politicians' side, privatization
would not be recommendable because:
* It dismantles the ejidos as social constituencies. For political parties it is much more difficult
to control a group of individuals than a communal entity attached to a specific territory.
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* It makes it extremely difficult to gain the vote of the lowest-income sectors, to which the
State cannot supply housing, and who cannot afford the options available in the formal
market.
* It makes a powerful political bargaining tool with ejidos disappear. For decades the implicit
allowance (and sometimes support) of informality within ejidal boundaries was an extremely
effective instrument of negotiation with ejidatarios, that can be summarized as the exchange
of votes for the right to illegally sell the land.
Land privatization also does not look attractive from the political perspective of ejidos because:
* Private landowners do not enjoy the preferential treatment that political authorities provide to
ejidatarios, which often take the form of benefits like subsidies, grants, and tax exemptions.
* Ejidos are powerful organizations whose demands are usually heard by the political
authorities and can influence the political agenda. This is very hard to do for small private
landowners who do not enjoy the support of a social organization.
This analysis challenges the widely held idea that the reforms of 1992 were really oriented to
land privatization. As Jones and Ward (1998) indicate, the deregulation of the ejido does not
necessarily mean its privatization. Indeed, there is much evidence to indicate that the supposed
profound reforms were in fact a rearrangement of the same public institutional framework that
would guarantee the continued intervention of the State in the ejido. Having the opportunity to
declare complete privatization from above, the government left this decision in the hands of the
agrarian communities, which have to fulfill a long and complex process that offers few incentives
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for them. In this sense, policies regarding land tenure are extremely ambiguous and even
contradictory, because the declared governmental objective of facilitating the urban development
of social land is hampered by an adherence to policies which promote the status quo with regards
to social property and the informal land market traditionally developed on it. Examples that
support this argument are the maintenance of land regularization programs, and the continuation
of access to subsidies and marketing networks exclusively oriented to ejidatarios (Jones and
Ward, 1998).
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Chapter 7
Cultural Attachment to Land
Los pierden su tierra pierden su historia47
Painted in the walls of the offices of ejido San Nicolis
The offices of ejido San Nicolis Totolapan are impressive. They are located in the square of the
village, next to the church, and both buildings are by far the most important of the area, since a
significant part of the social life of the community takes place there. What makes the offices
impressive is the colossal mural that decorates its walls. Painted according to the rich tradition of
Mexican muralists like Orozco, Rivera, or Alfaro Siqueiros, the mural aims to illustrate the
history of the village, the ejido, and the peasant movement in Mexico, and how they have
historically fought for accessing the land. The images are easily identifiable: a crucified peasant
observes Zapata and other revolutionaries accompanied by groups of peasants and native people
who are either cultivating the land or holding a rifle. All of them are fighting against the forces of
the capitalist evil, represented by despotic hacendados (hacienda owners) and corrupted
politicians supported by the United States, personified in the figure of Uncle Sam and a peasant
carrying a cross with the legends TLC (NAFTA) and ALCA (Free Trade Area of the Americas).
The images are joined with quotes referring to the relationship between ejido and land. "Land
was watered with our blood"; "Preserving the land means protecting what we obtain from it"; and
47 People who lose their land also lose their history.
City Growth and Community-Owned Land in Mexico City I Cultural Attachment to Land
"The best legacy of our land is the color of our skin" are some of the sentences that are written in
the mural.
The office of ejido San Gregorio is much more modest. Located between a grocery store and the
house of the ejido treasurer, it is small and looks shabby, though its facade also shows an
allegorical painting, which in this case is the figure of an indefatigable peasant cultivating corn
under the hard sun.
---_-,-~i
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Contrary to what might be expected, the
paintings are recent, and they reflect the
idealized image that ejidatarios have of
themselves and what they want to project to rest
of society. However, reality dramatically differs
from what is painted. Most of the parcels of the
ejido San Nicolhis are currently urbanized as a
product of continuous invasions and irregular
land sales, and agriculture is reduced to small
farms located in a bunch of parcels that still
subsist, while most of the population works in
sOtiviltca I not related t~ the ej;;iL In the c o1A1f
San Gregorio, most of the land is abandoned, and the few parcels utilized for agricultural
production are occupied by greenhouses. In this sense, the only peasant cultivating corn in San
Gregorio is the one who is painted in the ejido office.
Ejidos as Social Spaces
Ejidos were created as social spaces whose main purpose was not to increase the productivity in
the agrarian sphere, but to compensate for historical abuses committed in the rural realm. As
Bouquet (1996) points out, "land was not necessarily shared out based on purposes related to
productive efficiency...thus, land was distributed according to social networks, which did not
City Growth and Community-Owned Land in Mexico City ) Cultural Attachment to Land
necessarily coincide with the skills required to develop agricultural activities."4 8 As this author
indicates, until 1992 the ejidos were not understood from a commercial, but rather a social
perspective, which respected the traditional concept of land as the basis for the development of a
sense of community. In this sense, most of the ejidatarios never considered land as a commodity
but as a space intrinsically attached to a set of values and traditions that constitute their identity
(Siembieda, 1996).
Land redistribution was one of the demands that inspired the Mexican Revolution, and agrarian
communities are conscious that the price for reaching this goal was extremely high. Thousands of
their ancestors died while fighting for agrarian reform, and their memory is always present in any
discussion about ejido issues in Mexico. Thus, even in informal conversations it is common to
hear expressions like "our grandparents died for the land, so our duty is to preserve it", or "we
will defend our land until the final consequences, as our ancestors did". As Serna (1996) indicates
"the relationship that people have with land is deeply rooted, and that is why the fight for its
distribution, restitution, conservation, or exploitation still remains, being the reason that inspires
peasant mobilization."
Regarding this relationship to land, most of the ejidatarios see themselves as victims of an
unbalanced struggle against powerful forces looking to take away their lands (Jones and Ward,
1998). In their opinion, the fight for land still continues, but the enemy has changed. Big
landowners were the foes in the revolutionary times; the State was later, expropriating vast
extensions of land for dubious purposes without giving fair compensation. From their
perspective, the current enemies are private investors allied with the government, who passed the
48 Translated from the original Spanish by Rodrigo Diaz.
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reforms of 1992 with the clear objective of destroying social property in Mexico in order to
increase the stock of land available for development of all kinds of private projects. That is why
words like struggle, resistance, and defense are repeated once and again in any meeting in which
ejidatarios participate.
Preservation of the Myth of the Ejido
It is clear that the majority of the ejidatarios are proud to be considered the heirs of the
Revolution, even if their ancestors did not fight on it. Ejido membership still provides a special
status in Mexican society (Siembieda, 1996), and this status is recognized by the government
with treatment that private landowners do not enjoy. It is translated into a series of grants,
subsidies and credits whose utility are, at the very least, dubious, especially taking into account
that the correct use of those resources is seldom subject to accountability. This is one of the
reasons that explain why the urban ejidatarios still prefer to be treated as if they were peasants,
even when the majority of them do not obtain their income from agricultural activities.
Ejidos might be considered the last vestige of the Mexican Revolution, and this situation has been
seized by the communities in order to attract support for the causes that involve ejido interests.
As one ejidatario in San Gregorio commented, "in some sense, ejido membership is as valuable
as the land you possess in the ejido. Membership situates you in a higher status within your
community, something that the private landowners cannot say, even if their lands are attractive in
the real estate market."
This special status has also translated to the fact that most of the ejidatarios consider their land as
an independent territory, in which local rules are important and have more validity than the legal
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and administrative framework provided by the Constitution and the laws. As Bouquet (1996)
indicates, "something remarkable in the ejidatarios' discourse is the almost inexistent reference
to the Law. Therefore, their practices seem to be framed by locally designed rules, which
sometimes are near the agrarian legal framework, but often are completely distant."4 9 In fact, in
the couple of assemblies attended in San Gregorio Atlapulco the Comisario incessantly repeated
that the ejido is an autonomous entity, so this status makes its resolutions unquestionable by the
public institutions in charge of ejido issues. Agrarian communities like to be considered little
nations within the nation, in which decisions are made independent of what the legal regulations
dictate. Quoting Bouquet (1996), "it is worthy to mention the capacity of comisarios ejidales to
impose local rules, even though many times they contradict what is established in the Law." 50
Informal Land Market and Patrimony
The arguments given above provide a good explanation of why the majority of the ejidos were
reluctant to participate in the privatization process proposed by the reforms of 1992. In
Siembieda's words (1996), "the social nature of the ejido draws its continuity from viewing land
as a resource rather than as a commodity. As a resource, the ejido strives for sustaining its
members through common bonds to the land; as a commodity, it is solely a means to individual
gain, which occurs in the short run. Once the land is sold, the money spent, the ejidatario, many
times, is left with nothing."
At first glance all the arguments mentioned above are contradictory with the extended and
persistent practice of informal land sale within ejido boundaries. In fact, and as it was pointed out
49 Translated from the original Spanish by Rodrigo Diaz.
50 Translated from the original Spanish by Rodrigo Dfaz.
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in previous chapters, urban ejidos have lost a significant portion of their area due to illegal
practices that should not be expected from people who consider land as the most important factor
for building their identity as a community.
However, ejidatarios usually provide three arguments to justify this situation:
1) Most of the ejidatarios who illegally sold the land are poor, and they did it because it was the
only option they had to have some income. In this sense, ejidatarios usually blame the
government for the urban expansion in ejido lands, expressing that this situation would be
avoided if the ejidos received more financial aid.
2) Land has usually been sold to the lowest-income people, who cannot afford housing in the
formal sector. Many ejidatarios view this situation as a social service oriented to benefit the
most deprived sectors of the society. "At the end of the day, Zapata fought for them too", an
ejidatario from San NicolAs expressed. In addition, it is necessary to point out that in the long
term settlers are usually integrated to the community as avecindados, something that does not
happen with the people who buy a house in a formal residential area developed in land
privatized from an ejido.
3) Ejidatarios who informally sold the land actually commercialized the right for its occupancy,
but not its ownership nor the ejido membership. For them it is important to know that, despite
the fact that the land is occupied by settlers, from a legal perspective it still belongs to the
ejido, so they would not be betraying the principles that inspired the Revolution.
City Growth and Community-Owned Land in Mexico City I Cultural Attachment to Land
Worthy to mention is the case of regularizations carried out by CORETT. Experience says
that ejidatarios asked for it only when their land was invaded as a way to obtain some money
for land they assessed as lost. However, in the case of illegal sales the regularization is mainly
requested by the settlers, and usually faces resistance from the ejidatarios, who do not want
to lose the legal tenure of the urbanized land.
The same tolerance shown to ejidatarios who informally sold the land is not shown to the ejido
leaders who dealt with the government or private investors in the terms of an ejido land
transaction. In private they are usually called traitors ("vendepatrias"), not only because they
commercialized the land their ancestors fought for, but because they negotiated with the
traditional enemies of the agrarian cause, something that is not tolerated by the majority of
communities.
A New Approach
The reforms of 1992 changed the way in which the ejido was understood, replacing the non
mercantile-social vision for an approach based on the economic conception of the land (Bouquet,
1996). This market-based approach, that promotes the concepts of individualism and
entrepreneurship, clashes with the historical attitude that ejidos have had towards the land. For
the ejidatarios it is not easy to get rid of their land, even if there is a good economic offer for it.
That is one of the reasons that explain why no ejido has completely privatized in the land in the
MAMC. "Because patrimony, the ability to hand down one's heritage, is valued in Mexican
society, the privatization of ejidos will be slow, partial, and will take on different forms in
different regions of the country" (Siembieda, 1996).
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For the ejidatarios it is important to preserve the sense of community and all of the social (and
also economic) benefits attached to this condition. In this sense, privatization and incorporation
of land to the urban development might mean the end of their identity as ejidatarios, something
that it is still valued in the Mexican society.
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Conclusion
After sixteen years since their promulgation, it is clear that the outcomes of the reforms to Article
27 of the Mexican Constitution have been completely different than were originally expected.
The incorporation of social lands into urban development has been far below the levels that the
government predicted. Even worse, the irregular sale of ejido lands not only has continued, but
indeed has been consolidated in most of the Mexican cities.
The explanation for this phenomenon can be found in a series of interrelated factors that go
beyond the economic and institutional aspects usually argued in studies about the behavior of the
ejido communities after the approval of the constitutional reforms. In fact, it is possible to
identify three key issues that the ideologues of the reforms did not take into account and that have
direct effects on both the level of privatization and the perpetuation of the informal urban land
market within ejido boundaries.
First, the increasing levels of community participation in the reforms opened the door to conflicts
within the ejidos that hindered the process of liberalization of social lands and their incorporation
into the urban expansion. Rather than enhancing the relevance of the communities in the
decision-making processes, the new scenario increased the importance of the leaders, specially
the comisarios, who in fact control the discussion of any action implemented in the ejidos. Since
they have historically controlled the informal market of ejido land, the majority of them have
been reluctant to privatize land, as it could erode the privileged political and social status they
enjoy in their communities.
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In this sense, the Mexican experience challenges the idea promoted by institutions like the World
Bank that land privatization is necessarily related to increasing levels of democratization. Most of
the ejidos were not prepared to fulfill the minimum requirements necessary for developing
participatory processes, and those communities that decided to privatize parts of their parcels
were usually controlled by authoritarian leaders who are real dictators in the communities.
Second, the democratization of Mexican society did not translated into the democratization of the
ejido, but into the development of new forms of clientelism characterized by the proliferation of
both public institutions that deal with ejido affairs and groups within the communities who are
looking for the patronage of political authorities. In this scenario, land privatization is attractive
to few stakeholders. From the perspective of the politicians it threatens to dismantle their long-
time constituencies structured around a territory. These constituencies are both the ejidatarios
and the settlers who have illegally bought or invaded ejido land, and whose potential votes have
historically been controlled by political leaders who have either organized, supported or protected
illegal forms of land occupation.
From the ejidatarios' point of view it translates into the loss of a series of benefits (subsidies,
grants, credits) derived from the clientelistic relationship developed for decades. Ejidos have an
intrinsic political value, and their members are not willing to sacrifice it, especially considering
that as private landowners their access to political power and its related benefits disappear.
Finally, the cultural attachment to land hampers the government's plans to incorporate social land
into the formal urban real estate market. Land is more than a commodity that can be transacted in
the market; it is the element that structures ejidos as communities. These social and cultural
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associations make the ejidos reluctant to privatize land. However, informal commercialization is
not always condemned, because it allows ejidatarios to retain land ownership, something
extremely valued in agrarian communities. In this context, privatization as it is defined in the law
is usually seen as a betrayal of the principles that inspired the Mexican Revolution, especially
since it involves the participation of the government and public investors, who are seen as the real
enemies by a significant part of the ejido population.
The Mexican Gattopardo
The reforms of 1992 did not recognize that ejidos have three dimensions -economic, political,
and cultural (Goldring, 1998). These reforms assumed ejidatarios behave according to a market-
based logic in which land is a commodity that can be transacted if there is sufficient economic
opportunity. However, it is reasonable to question whether the government really pursued the
massive privatization of ejido land. As other studies point out (Austin, 1994; Jones and Ward,
1998; Jones and Pisa, 2000; Olivera, 2005), the reforms introduced to Article 27 and the
complementary laws (Agrarian Code, Human Settlements Law) were no more than small
modifications meant to adjust the ejidos to the economic and political realities of contemporary
Mexico. Indeed the State was never willing to introduce drastic changes to the ejidos structure or
to the ways they have traditionally related to the government.
In fact, the 1992 constitutional reforms reaffirm the ambiguous and contradictory policies
regarding land tenure and urban development in Mexico. On the one hand, the reforms propose to
incorporate ejido land into the urban fabric through privatization. On the other hand, the system
of privatization is extremely complex and slow, making it unattractive for both the ejidatarios
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and the private sector. In addition, the package of economic and social benefits reserved for
ejidatarios is preserved, but not extended to private landowners; therefore, there are few
incentives to leave the social structure of the ejidos. Finally, the preservation of permanent
policies of land tenure regularization that in practice do not penalize informal practices creates
the perfect scenario for the perpetuation of an illegal market of ejido land.
This situation recalls the famous adage of di Lampedusa's novel II Gattopardo (The Leopard):
"changing something to make sure that everything stays the same." The experience of the last
sixteen years demonstrates that neither the government, the ejidatarios nor the private sector have
been willing to change the model that has accorded many advantages for them. None of these
stakeholders have been willing to pay the costs necessary for the adequate incorporation of social
land into the urban development: the State has not been willing to lose its political control over
the agrarian communities; the ejidos have not wanted to lose the social and economic privileges
acquired after decades of political patronage; and most of the private investors have preferred to
avoid negotiations that involve the participation of agrarian communities.
This ejido 'gattopardism' was the strategy of a government that implemented measures according
to its neo-liberal agenda, but that never intended to implement any initiative that might
compromise its political control over agrarian communities since the first years of the post
revolution. Thus, the idea of dismantling the mechanisms of state intervention was in practice a
rearrangement of the institutions and instruments used to intervene in the internal life of the
ejidos (Jones and Ward, 1998; Olivera, 2005).
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On the ejido side, the original mistrust of the reforms resulted in the adaptation to the new
scenario, characterized by the consolidation of the illegal forms of land commercialization. In
fact, the process of delimitation and certification of ejido land implemented by PROCEDE,
interpreted as a de facto privatization by many ejidatarios, provided a halo of legality to the
informal market. In this context, land is wrongly treated as if it was private property, which
allows ejidatarios to commercialize it more easily at a higher price while retaining ownership
(Goldring, 1998).
Some Ideas for the Incorporation of Ejido Land into Urban Development
Mexican cities will continue grow and most of the expansion will take place, one way or another,
in ejido lands. In such a scenario, the current legal and administrative frameworks however are a
hindrance to urban planning. Their ambiguity and complexity create a disincentive to legal and
controlled land incorporation by allowing for the perpetuation and consolidation of illegal
practices that have a disastrous effect on the urban fabric.
Based on the research in this thesis, some measures could be adopted in order to facilitate the
adequate incorporation of social land into urban expansion, while also protecting the rights and
aspirations of the agrarian communities.
1) It is necessary to differentiate between urban and rural ejidos. They have dissimilar dynamics
and characteristics, and the problems they face are quite different. Therefore, it is
indispensable to develop legal and administrative frameworks that recognize these differences
and also establishing an ad hoc system of public institutions and policies for each type of
ejido. Making more transparent the system of benefits that ejidos currently receive is also
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critical. These benefits should be targeted to the ejidatarios who really need them and should
be accountable to the public institutions that provide them.
2) Exploring new forms of land tenure that are in between social and private properties may fit
better with the traditional forms of property in the agrarian communities. For example, land
trusts may be an alternative model to consider as they could preserve ejidatarios' land
ownership while supplying secure tenure to households. These land trusts should be oriented
to the lowest-income households. Moreover, they could be an adequate way to regularize
squatter settlements that currently exist, a process that often faces the opposition of the
ejidatarios who are not willing to lose the ownership of their lands. This land reform should
be accompanied by the gradual disappearance of permanent regularization programs, like
CORETT, which perpetuate illegal practices within the ejidos.
3) Although it can generate strong opposition from the ejidatarios, it is indispensable to
introduce modifications in the way the communities are structured. Making the system of
membership succession more flexible would allow younger people to join, who might be
interested in developing new initiatives, not necessarily related to urban expansion, in ejido
lands.
In addition, and in order to counterbalance the excessive power of the comisarios, it is
advisable to implement mechanisms to enhance their public accountability.
Ejidos are extremely complex social institutions; their multidimensionality makes it difficult to
incorporate them into urban planning processes. They are the last vestige of the Revolution: their
organization and structure correspond to a historical moment in which most of the Mexican
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population was comprised of landless peasants. Ejidos did not adjust to the demographic,
economic, and social changes experienced by Mexico during the last century, and their structure
is basically the same as ninety years ago, when the urban context was different and the agrarian
communities were not relevant actors in urban development.
Since they own most of the lands that surround the main Mexican cities, urban plans should
acknowledge their particular characteristics and dynamics. In fact, we have shown that drastic
changes might even produce effects that are the opposite of what was intended. For this reason, it
is advisable that urban policies adopt a piecemeal approach, in which the changes are
incorporated slowly starting in areas where it is most feasible. The three options outlined above
will not solve all the problems of the urban expansion in social lands, but provide a framework
for the implementation of urban policies more suitable to the ejido context.
Ejidos are too important in urban development to be ignored by planners. Incorporating them in
urban plans is a difficult task, but not impossible if it is approached from a multidisciplinary
perspective that recognizes their complexity and multiple dimensions.
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